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Professor Philip Kurland in a recent issue of the Harvard Law
Review' unleashed an attack upon the United States Supreme Court
that can only, as Anthony Lewis said, "go down as one of the most
sarcastic, all-inclusive works of criticism directed at the Supreme Court
in recent years." 2 Professor Kurland warns us that a part of his criticism will be appreciated only by those who aspire to membership in
Mr. Justice Holmes' "Society of Jobbists." Since we do not fully appreciate, or for that matter understand, his attack it follows logically
that we are not members of the society; since Professor Kurland does,
it probably follows that he is. Learned Hand, who named the organi3
zation and aspired to membership, considered himself unworthy.
One aspect of the Court's business to come under particular fire
was its handling of the reapportionment cases. Their resolution of
this problem was for Professor Kurland a "simple" solution for "simple-minded people." 4 Since this article, for the most part, defends the
reapportionment decisions, it might be said that the authors aspire
to, but consider themselves unworthy of, membership in Professor
Kurland's newly formed "Society of the Simple Minded."
THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Prior to 1962, while most observers of the American system were
becoming increasingly concerned with the gross disparities in state
legislative apportionment, the United States Supreme Court chose to
*Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., B.A. 1958, LL.B. 1961, University of Georgia; LL.M.

1962, University of Illinois; Member of Georgia Bar; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Florida.
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., B.A. 1955, Miami University; J.D. 1960, Ohio State
University; Member of California and Ohio Bars; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Florida.
1. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term - Foreword: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78
I-ARv. L. REv. 143 (1964).
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1964, §4, p. 6, col. 4.
3. HAND, THF Spar oF LmERTY 62 (Dilliard ed. 1952).
4. Kurand, supra note 1, at 170.
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remain aloof. The turning point came in Baker v. Carr.5 The "mop
up" operation continued with Wesberry v. Sanders6 and The 1964 Reapportionment Cases.7 The net result was to establish as a constitutional standard, judicially enforceable, that in both Congressional
elections and the elections of state legislatures each qualified voter is
entitled to one vote and that vote must be weighted no more nor less
than any other vote.
Much has been written about reapportionment, especially since
Baker.8 We have no desire to duplicate what has been said before,
but rather to use the reapportionment cases as a vehicle to explore
"the fundamentals of constitutional adjudication." Possibly the subject defies analysis, for it is certainly true that neither the judges, the
professors, nor the lawyers have been able to come to grips with it.
The American legal realists pointed this up when they punched a
gaping hole in the warm blanket of classical mechanical jurisprudence. 9 Gone was the comfortable image of the learned judge sitting
down with statute and constitution, law book and slide rule, and
through the application of his special skills coming to an impartial
and precise answer to the important questions facing the nation. The
realist had shown us that in most, if not all, cases of sufficient doubt to
reach a high appellate tribunal, the judge could, while applying faithfully all the traditional tools of adjudication, decide the case either
way.

One cannot be angry with the scientist who merely tells us there is
a dangerous virus loose in the community, so long as we believe that
he is stating his honest opinion. We may question his ability and
therefore dispute his conclusion. Our questions may be based upon
sincere doubts as to his qualifications, or they may be prompted by
our own irrational unwillingness to accept the presence of the virus.
But suppose we were suddenly told that the scientist had some choice
in the matter of whether or not the virus existed -that he did not
discover it, he created it!
In our imaginary case of the scientist the problem might have a
simple solution -get rid of the man! Take away his power to create
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
7. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 84 Sup. Ct. 1472 (1964); Roman
v. Sincock, 84 Sup. Ct. 1462 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 84 Sup. Ct. 1453 (1964); Maryland v. Tawes, 84 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1964); WMAC, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 84 Sup. Ct. 1418
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1964).
8. See, e.g., Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress, 72 YALE L.J. 13
(1962); Krastin, The Implementation of Representative Government in a Democracy, 48 IOWA L. REV. 549 (1963); McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts:
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MicH. L. REV. 645 (1963).
9. See generally Miller : Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. Cmu. L. REV. 501 (1959-1960).
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virus. But in the case of the Court it is not so simple, for one man's
virus is another man's antibiotic, and the antibiotic may be desperately
needed.
When we are concerned with statutory interpretation or common
law adjudication the problem is not quite so serious. If the judge
abuses the great power necessarily given him by the inherent flexibility of his function, the elected representatives of the people can
adopt a statute specific enough to overrule the particular odious
decision.
The seriousness of the matter increases substantially when we deal
with a constitution that to be useful must be difficult to change, and
where the judge's decisional leeway is greater because the document
was written in more general terms and at a time when its authors could
not have imagined in their wildest reveries the situations in which
it would be relevant today. Thirty years ago some were suggesting the
same remedy as in our case of the scientist. Do away with theml Take
away their power to decidel But our experience since then, the instances of unjust and sometimes inhumane acts by legislative and
executive officers, impelled by the passions of wars, hot and cold, or
by deep-seated irrational prejudices, has caused all but a few to
abandon this quick solution.
Some have chosen to ignore the hole in the blanket and to pretend
they are still wrapped safely inside although the cold wind whistles
through. Some who recognize that the hole exists seem to suggest that
the system will work best if the Court pretends the blanket is still
intact by going through the motions and pretences of mechanical decision making. Some have suggested that if we think hard enough perhaps we can discover a new jurisprudence that will relieve the judge
of the awesome power, and hence, responsibility of choice. Perhaps
this is true, but no progress has been made in this direction, not even
by those who most strongly urge it, and the Court cannot sit and wait
for a discovery that may never come. Some suggest mere recognition
of the judges' power and urge in rather general terms ways in which
the judge might improve his methods and facilities for making value
choices. All would agree that if the judge must make choices for us,
let them be the best choices, but this does not satisfy the philosophical
need to know why and by what authority he does make them. Finally,
some who should know better merely lash out against the fact that
things are not as they once were or appeared to be, without suggesting
how they might be made so "again."
In the reapportionment cases the paradox reaches its zenith. We
have suggested that in nonconstitutional adjudication the elected
representatives of the people are the watchdogs of the newly recognized power of the courts. But what if the so-called representatives do
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not in fact represent the people but have usurped power by creating
or clinging to "rotten boroughs"? Then the democratic ideal has hit
a low ebb. Who then shall make the legislatures responsible to the
people? Who is available save the courts? But now we have the
watched controlling its own watchdogs. Furthermore, since the Court
is reapportioning on constitutional grounds, the watched (the Court)
is controlling the watchdogs with the power of the watched that is
itself hardest to control.
Perhaps this only appears to be a dilemma. There are other ways
of controlling the Supreme Court besides amending the Constitution.
New blood will be infused from time to time into the Court by the
President. Congress controls the size of the Court and to some extent
its jurisdiction, although the scope of this latter control is by no means
certain today. The Court must depend upon the Executive to enforce
its orders. It is after all, as has often been said, the "least dangerous
branch," possessed of neither sword nor purse. Perhaps it is more
accurate to say that the Court watches the legislatures, and the legislatures watch the Court, and that nebulous reality called public
opinion oversees the whole show.
The reapportionment cases provide an excellent case study of how
this model works. Public opinion, we believe, is often much more
reliable on a given subject than experts in that area will concede.
So it is with constitutional law. This after all, lies at the root of our
faith in the democratic principle. In the long run the society will be
best served if the people are given the opportunity to express their
opinions, rather than being forced to rely on the unbridled discretion
of experts. All other things being equal, it would seem to follow that
the more enlightened the public, the more reliable their opinion. We
suspect that most people sense the realistic role of the Supreme
Court in our American system, and accept it as such. Nevertheless,
they would no doubt feel better and perhaps opine more effectively
if someone were to assist them in articulating that role. This, however, cannot be done until the legal scholars have been able to articulate it for themselves.
We have no delusions that we shall succeed where abler and more
experienced minds have failed. But we imagine that the answer, albeit a temporary one, will come after many unsuccessful sorties by
minds great and small, each perhaps containing a modicum of truth
hidden under a multitude of errors. So, with the reapportionment
cases as our tool, we rush in where angels fear to tread.
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Apportionment - A JusticiableIssue?
Two questions lie at the heart of any analysis of the reapportionment decisions. First, is apportionment a proper matter for the courts?
Second, for those who believe that it is or who acknowledge the
Court's entry into the area fait accompli, what should be the constitutionally acceptable standard of apportionment?
In Baker v. Carr the Court answered the first question in the affirmative. In The 1964 Reapportionment Cases the Court set the
standard that has come to be called with rough accuracy, "one man,
one vote."
Critics of the decisions have argued that the Court has entered
the political thicket and forced its own political philosophies on the
states; that the nation is thus headed toward pure democracy that
will at least erode the present federal structure and at worst destroy
its own ends;10 that there is no historical justification for the "one
man, one vote" concept; and that the United States Supreme Court
should not take it upon itself to reorganize the various legislative
bodies.
Many of the Court's critics are, as usual, primarily disturbed by
the results. They have a philosophical or practical preference for
the status quo. Or while they did not necessarily approve of the preBaker situation, they dislike the "pure democratic" overtones of the
Court's standard. Others appear to be more legitimately concerned
with whether the Court is operating in its proper sphere and performing its duty correctly. For example, Professor Alexander Bickel

suggests that the reapportionment cases permit the federal judges
to resume "second guessing" the Congress and the legislatures of
the fifty states, and this, he argues, they are unfit and unentitled to
do.1 History points up examples that on the surface tend to substantiate Professor Bickel's fears.

In Hammer v. Dagenhart2 the

Court had before it a federal statute that prevented interstate shipment of goods that were the products of child labor. The majority
refused to accept the Government's contention that Congress could
find evil in child labor and had, under the commerce clause, the

authority to keep the products of such labor out of the stream of
commerce. Justice Holmes said in dissent, "But I had thought that
the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist in some
cases was for the consideration of Congress alone, and that this Court

10. Morley, The Supreme Court and the Republic, Fortune, Aug. 1964, p. 102.

11. Bickel, Reapportionment and the Courts, The New Republic, June 27,
1964, p. 7.
12. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon ques'
tions of policy and morals.

'1 3

Thirteen years earlier the Court using the shibboleth "freedom to
contract" had prevented a state from setting a maximum work week
of sixty hours in what was believed to be an unhealthy occupation.
Holmes' dissent had been even more biting: "This case is decided
upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain ....

But a Constitution is not intended to embody a par-

ticular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.' 14 A constitution,
however, is intended to embody a political theory. Can the Court
wash its hands of this fact when called upon to interpret the document?
What then are the answers to the questions posed? First, it is
clear that no categorical answer can be forthcoming. At best, the
questions raised lead into another problem that must be examined
if the reapportionment cases are to receive a fair hearing. Professor
Bickel hints that the decisions are inconsistent with the Court's function in the American system of law and government. This article is
an attempt to demonstrate the opposite position, that is, the reapportionment decisions are consistent with the function of the Supreme Court, in fact that cases such as these lie at the heart of the
need for a Supreme Court in our American system. If the Court has no
business watching over "democratic man" and seeing to it that he is
able to effectively perform the many functions required in the "democratic state," beginning with the basic duty to mold the structure of "a
free representative government,"'15 then what is it's business? Who
is better able, and better equipped to see to it that the people can
operate in a political community suited to achievement of the
"ideal"? If representative government is said to be the base point 6
from which the ideal will emerge, then surely it too demands protection if the ideal is to be sought.
The court in Moss v. Burkhart17 when called upon to reapportion
the legislature of the state of Oklahoma said that "if apportionment
is to be our lot, we should not stop short of the ideal."18 This then,
as with the federal court in Oklahoma, will be our goal- first to
discover whether apportionment "be our lot" and then to search for
the "ideal." To state it differently-what is meant by representative

13.

Id. at 280.

14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
15.
16.

See

CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN

HUTCHINS,

Two

FACES OF FEDERALISM

(1961).

5-12 (1961).

17. 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
18. Id. at 156.
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government within the framework of the federal Constitution, and
what are the duties and responsibilities of the Supreme Court in deciding or not deciding reapportionment cases?
Apportionment - The Standard
Since the primary focus of this article will be on apportionment
of state legislatures, it will center around the decisions in Baker and
Reynolds. Certainly they cannot be considered as all-encompassing,
for the other cases analyzing the appropriate weight to be accorded
one person's vote vis-h-vis another's are inextricably interwoven into
the two principal cases and must be examined accordingly. 9
In Baker, the majority held, or as Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out,
only held, that an allegation that the apportionment of the Tennessee
Legislature invidiously discriminated against the complainants by
diluting the effect of their votes, in comparison with others similarly
situated, stated a cause of action. The question thus presented was
found to be justiciable, not a "political question," and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was adequate to ensure
federal court jurisdiction.
In Reynolds, the Court set forth a constitutional standard by
which state legislative apportionment was to be tested against the
20
equal protection clause:
We hold that as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated an individual's right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in
a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of
citizens living in other parts of the state.
The Court recognized that absolutes are unworkable and was unwilling to apply them: "So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to
the
the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from
2
equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible." '
The Court, however, was unwilling to accept as "legitimate considerations" most of the rationalizations generally given for legisla19. E.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 576 U.S. 1 (1964): under art. I, §2, congressional
districts must be based on equal population as nearly as possible. Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963): The Georgia county unit system gave way to "one man, one
vote." See Bondurant, A Stream Polluted at Its Source: The Georgia County Unit
System, 12 J. PuB. L. 86 (1963).
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362, 1385 (1964).
21. Id. at 1391.
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tive districts of unequal population, for example, history, economic
or group interest, and area representation. The only factor that the
court suggested as a "legitimate consideration" was assurance of "some
voice to political subdivisions as political subdivisions," and this only
so long as "population is [not] submerged as the controlling consideration."22
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

In order to discover just what Mr. Chief Justice Warren meant
when he indicated that population must be the controlling consideration, it is necessary first to examine the nature of a written constitution and its philosophical origins and purpose.
Is it necessary that a contract by the people to be governed be
committed to paper? Certainly many advanced cultures have produced patriots, scholars, scientists, educators, and other great men
and institutions without the aid of a written constitution. Yet men
have struggled for centuries to establish certain bounds within which
government must operate. Magna Charta, though not too helpful in
"stormy weather," was just such an attempt.2 3
With the birth of any new nation, especially one born of revolt,
come new and fresh promises - fresh and new in the sense that "fresh
and new" people make them. The promises themselves have been
made many times before in history, but never kept. What then made
the promises of 1787 unique, if indeed they were? What, in fact,
were the promises?
Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in Wesbery argues that the founding fathers did not promise nor intend "one man, one vote." Others
agree, arguing that mathematical certainty is not a democracy, that
dictators use mathematical certainty to point to their elections as
being truly democratic. They say that the Court has turned the election system over to the computer and that democracy is not a problem
in mathematics.2 4 Implicit in this analysis is the overriding feeling
that the existing system, conceding it is based on malapportionment,
has worked effectively thus far; therefore, why alter it for uncertainty?
Why permit the Court to tamper with intangibles?
Few conceptions have caused more confusion, excited more passions, and elicited more debates than representative government in a
democratic society. 25 The notion is old, the development consistently

22. Id. at 1392.
23. CAHN, op. cit. supra note 15.
24. Bingham, Legislative Representation by
(summer 1964).
25. See CAHN, op. cit. supra note 15.
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inconsistent. For the most part, political philosophers agree that some
form of government is essential to the growth and development of
man and his state.2 6 But they tend to disagree as to the form government must take in order to achieve the desired results in a given
society.
How shall it be decided whether one man, many men, or no men
shall govern? Plato and Aristotle, just as Montesquieu and Mill,
examined the worth of various methods of government. Aristotle
searched for the ultimate power. Should it be in the rich, thus discriminating against the poor? Or should it be in both the rich and the
poor thus seemingly discriminating against the rich?
Most great political philosophers formulate an ideal government
and then, recognizing the impracticability of their concept, tend to
follow the course of Plato when he admits that the state he fashioned
in The Republic will not work. Aristotle concedes that many of his
governmental ideals would fail if put to the test. Montesquieu goes
so far as to contend that despotism is the only practical form of
government for certain cultures.
A common denominator of the ideal stressed by Plato, Aristotle,
Montesquieu, and others is that government derives its power from
people, and that when people consent to be governed they should so
state in a document setting forth how they are to be regulated. The
concept of popular sovereignty that pervades the Declaration of Independence carries out the theme27 that the people are supreme. But
the Declaration was not the document by which a nation would be
governed; it was designed rather to put the colonists' case before the
world. It defended, under certain specified circumstances, the right to
revolt.2 8 The people still needed a contract of government. The
founding fathers were well aware of the fact that constitutions need
not be written; however, they chose to put their contract into writing.
They wanted to assure the colonists that the "people" would rule.
Who then are the "people"? The difficulty is, of course, that neither
the ancient, nor the eighteenth century political philosophers generally understood the concept of "the people" to include liberty and
equality of choice for all men. Slavery, unemancipated females, discriminations based upon wealth, race, or condition of servitude were
evident in one form or another in most cultures including that of
the colonies. 2 1 The wisdom then, is not in how the founding fathers
26. Excluding, of course, those who adhere to the Marxian conception of the
ultimate elimination of the state and the various philosophies of anarchy.
27. Had it failed the theory would have gone to the gallows with our great
revolutionary heroes.
28. Circumstances that did not exist after the ratification of the Constitution.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
29.

LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION

(1960).
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kept their own house, or how they thought their house should be
kept, but in the fact that they produced a document distilled from
centuries of thought implying the supremacy of man. They left to
each generation, just as had been left to them - in theory, the "inalienable right" to examine and dictate or discard as they deemed
necessary, societies' institutions.30
The state changes as science develops, and civilization becomes
more and more complex. Many functions once thought to be the
province of private charity now patently require government action.
The document alone cannot withstand such abrupt change; to be
effective it must be implemented. Article III grants to the Court
the power to keep the Constitution alive.
To aid in the implementation of the social contract, history is
valuable but not an end-all. To discover the nature of "democratic
man" the living must also be consulted. The contract belongs to the
living and "ought not be read in the fading light of its origins but
31
rather in the high noon of the present situation."'
But the contract does separate, by its very wording, the powers of
the Government. Who then regulates the right of man to vote in a
democracy? Who then regulates the weight to be attached to a given
man's voice in a democracy? Has the Court entered the wrong arena
when it accepts reapportionment cases and decides those cases on their
merits? Is the Supreme Court, upon entry into the arena, concluding that it is implicit in the contract that democratic man to
be effective in his society be given an effective voice in his government? Is the conclusion reached in light of constitutional principles?
If one principle runs through the centuries of thought on democratic political ideals, it is that for a government to operate effectively,
"man" must be involved in governing as well as being governed.
Democracy implies specific political, civil, and economic liberties.
Democracy, by its very nature, is a faith in the individual and his
ability to conduct his affairs. It is true that many great political
philosophers, taken separately, would probably concur in the general
theory, but be unable to agree on proper implementation. Yet their
theory has been codified; the Constitution does impart a democratic
faith. Given the opportunity, "man" can rule himself; he can be
trusted with his own destiny. But implementation of the idea was
3
as difficult for the founding fathers as for their predecessors;

2

it

remains difficult to this day. Nevertheless, certain guidelines are in
evidence, are basic; implementation in a democratic society demands
some degree of suffrage, involvement, and representation in the ad-

31.

op. cit. supra note 15, at 22.
Id. at 34.

32.

Kendall, Book Review, 16 STAN. L. REv. 755 (1964).

30.

CAHN,
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ministration of the state. Not merely Aristotle's city-state, but involvement at all levels of government, even possibly in the world-state.
But to what extent must he be involved? Must every man be involved to the same degree as every other? Is there sufficient evidence
for a judicial decision?
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

The power of a court to decide that an act of a legislative body
is in conflict with organic law is not a universally recognized principle.
It is in fact rather unique. Perhaps then it is necessary to consider
for a moment how and why such power became a fundamental part
of our American system of government.
Article III provides that "the judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." But the Constitution does not expressly delegate to the Supreme Court or any
other court the power to declare acts of Congress or of state legislatures unconstitutional.
In Ware v. Hylton,33 Mr. John Marshall argued that jurisdiction
must be expressly granted before the Supreme Court would have
authority to act. 34 Marshall the advocate, fortunately, did not prevail
when Marshall the jurist was presented with the question of judicial
5
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall found the
review. In Marbury v. Madisonpower of judicial review implied in the Constitution. Whatever reasons motivated Marshall, 36 the concept was established no longer to
be seriously challenged.
The Court, according to Marshall, has the inherent function of
interpreting and applying the law. This statement was more remarkable than it now appears, in light of the apparent feeling of the time
that it was anti-republican for the judiciary to inquire into the constitutionality of acts of the legislature.3 7 It becomes obvious on reflection that Marshall's concept was based upon a value choice, a
preference for the judiciary over the legislative branch. It was prob33. 3 U.S. (3 Daln.) 199 (1796).
34. "Mhe judicial authority can have no right to question the validity of
a law unless such jurisdiction is expressly given by the constitution." Id. at 211.
35. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). One of the reasons given for the framers'
failure to spell-out judicial review was that it was not thought to be necessary. It
was considered so basic an element of the law and the times that to enumerate
was deemed irrelevant. 1 ScmvARTz, THE PowEs OF GOVERNMENT 17 (1963).
36. See COHEN, THE FArrH OF A LIBERAL 178-80 (1946).
27. Thayer, American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HA~tv. L. REv. 129,
133 (1893). Prior to 1808, judges in Ohio were impeached for holding acts of the
legislature unconstitutional, id. at 134.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964],
Art. 1
[[Vol. XVII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

ably necessary, however, for the preservation of the republic. 38 According to Marshall's rationale, if it be within the "peculiar province
of the courts" to interpret the laws, and since the Constitution is the
supreme law taking precedent over all else, where the laws are contradictory, and where one of the "laws" is the Constitution while the
other is a state or federal enactment, the Court must apply the su39
preme law even though it entails ignoring the inferior law.
The classicists take this to mean that the Constitution is analogous
to a key used by a grader to mark "objective" examinations. As Mr.
Justice Roberts stated in United States v. Butler,40 "When an act of
Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming
to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government
has only one duty, to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
''
the latter squares with the former. 41
Mr. Justice Holmes, on the other hand, could not find in the
Constitution the same neat mathematical formula. The provisions
of the Constitution to Holmes were "organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is
to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but
' 42
by considering their origin and their line of growth."
The conflicting philosophies of the justices demonstrate the vitality of the fundamental document. The classicist thought he was
able to develop by deductive reasoning enforced by such ephemeral
factors as "precedent" and "intent of the framers" an indisputable
conclusion as to the constitutionality of any particular piece of legis-

38. This position has been challenged by many able legal scholars including
M. R. Cohen. Mr. Cohen argues that Marshall was establishing a completely new
philosophy. Many countries operate effectively under a written constitution
where the power of judicial review does not exist. The French Constitution, for
example, written before Marbury, did not permit judicial veto. The Swiss Constitution does not give the judiciary the power spelled-out by Marshall in
Marbury. See generally COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL (1946). Certainly the
judiciary is not the end-all as this would seem to suggest. The fact that Marshall
found judicial review implicit in the Constitution does not hinder the system,
but rather enhances the flexibility of the United States constitutional form of
government. As Mr. Justice Douglas put it: the court could not "withstand for
long an executive or a legislative power that had the consensus of the nation
behind it." See THE GREAT RIGHTS 119-20 (Cahn ed. 1963). Notwithstanding Mr.
Cohen and other critics of Marbury, the Court is basic in our system of government.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 521, 525 (Cooke ed. 1961).
40. 279 U.S. 1 (1936).
41. Id. at 62.
42. Quoted in BIDDLE, JUSTIcE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 75 (1961).
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lation. The Constitution was "formal and literal" and not as Holmes
' 3
would argue "organic and alive." l
There is, however, one point both schools of thought must agree
upon else the role of the Court be rendered useless in the eyes of
the citizens. It is imperative that the justice understand his function
whether he view the document as a fixed set of rules or as a vital
living organism. His value judgment may be questioned and criticized, but, hopefully, not his moral commitment to his conception
of that function.
THE CLAssicisTs' APPROACH

State legislative apportionment is accomplished by legislative enactment or by state constitution. Assume for a moment that the
classic approach is correct; a pre-Baker legislative apportionment statute, if challenged, would be placed beside the Constitution to determine its validity. Assume for our argument that the challenger
lives in a suburban area. In the upper house his vote is worth 1/180
of a vote in the least populous district in the state. In the lower house
his vote is worth 1/170 of a vote in the district of least population.
The classicist should initially rely on the text of the Constitution
and his powers of deductive reasoning in examining the Constitution.
Two clauses may appear to be of value to his cause: article IV, section 4 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union
a Republican Form of Government" (hereinafter "the guarantee
clause") and amendment XIV "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law" (hereinafter
"the equal protection clause"). If the challenger invokes either or both,
the task for the judge is simple: apply his deductive reasoning powers
and come up with the "correct" constitutional result.
The judge's initial concern will probably be with the guarantee
clause. Who is the "United States" that guarantees a republican
form of government to the states? The President? The Congress?
The United States Supreme Court? The Constitution itself gives little
aid in answering the question. The United States is the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches jointly and severally. Since uncertainty exists, it could be argued that the Court should not act. But
should the complexity of the problem be determinative of judicial
action, for if the Court will not act, who shall? Marshall said the
43. Ibid. One might venture to inquire of the classicist why it is necessary to
have several tiers of appellate courts culminating in a Supreme Court on which
judges of roughly equivalent intelligence, training, and good faith have disagreed
emphatically, from time to time, on given questions of constitutionality. Surely
the "slide rule" approach tolerates little diversity, and that based solely on a
lack of judicial competence or integrity.
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court has no more right to refrain from acting when it should than
44
it does to act when it should not.

If our mythical judge concludes that "The United States" means,
in the final analysis, the United States Supreme Court, 45 he must then
define "Republican Form of Government." Mr. Justice Wilson in
Chisholm v. Georgia46 defined it as a government wherein the "Su'
preme Power resides in the body of the people."47
The people share
in one public institution; their voice is heard through elected representatives who are responsible to them. But in choosing an officer to
represent the people, some or all must have the responsibility by vote.
Does this mean that it must be demonstrated that every citizen is
entitled to cast a vote, before the republican concept is satisfied; or
does it mean that if some citizens are allowed to vote, the requirement
is met? Suppose only the governor is permitted to vote or ten or one
hundred persons? At what point does the franchise become so restricted that the state is no longer "republican" in fact? Surely, somewherel And if a state in which only ten were permitted to vote is
not republican, could it be argued that a state in which ten votes
counted for more than all the rest combined, is republican?
Luther v. Borden 48 concluded that the right to demand a republican form of government was not enforceable in the courts. Georgia
v. Stanton49 and Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon-O
reaffirmed this position. But if we allow the judge to hedge his reasoning with this "precedent," he must still examine the equal protection clause. It is apparent that equal protection does not mean that
all persons must end up in the same position as the result of governmental action. The fact that one murderer is executed does not mean
another could not constitutionally be granted a commutation.
On the other hand, a law might appear egalitarian on its face but
be unequal in effect. For example, prior to Gideon v. Wainwright,51
the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantee that an accused have
the assistance of counsel was of little value to one who could not
afford to hire an attorney. But as Anatole France once said, the laws
of France, in their great egalitarianism, forbade the rich and poor
alike from sleeping under the bridges of Paris. Yet some would argue
that this concept and Gideon go beyond the realm of equality before
the law and into the area of economic equality, a concept that if the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
But see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Id. at 457.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
223 U.S. 118 (1912).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Constitution does not forbid, it surely does not require. Still others
would say that even with Gideon the indigent defendant with an inexperienced court-appointed counsel or an overworked public defender hardly receives equality before the law as compared to the
wealthy accused with his battery of top-notch criminal lawyers.
Reasoning v. Reasonableness
It is the essence of the law to make distinctions. The guilty must
be dealt with; the innocent must go free. But equal protection means
something. If we may again hedge our deductive reasoning, we know,
as well as legislative purpose can ever be known, that at least one of
the purposes for the proposal and adoption of the equal protection
clause was to prevent legal distinctions based solely on race or previous condition of servitude. From this we may infer that the purpose
of the clause is to prohibit unfair or irrelevant legal distinctions. To
state it differently, to prohibit "unreasonable" distinctions. This is
in fact the course the Court has taken. Suppose our mythical judge
has gone this far. How is he to determine which distinctions are
"reasonable" and which are not? To determine "reasonableness,"
must courts become, as Felix Cohen put it, "lunacy commissions"
52
passing on the sanity of the legislators?
If a majority of state legislators determine it to be in the best
interest of the citizens of their state for Negroes to attend separate
(but equal, of course) schools, can that decision stand as reasonable?
3
seemed to imply that it could, but Brown v.
Plessy v. Ferguson5
Board of Education- disagreed. How can a ruling by a federal administrative agency, presumably possessing some expertise in its field,
that an employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice be set aside by
a court as "unreasonable"? Is the Court challenging the sanity of
that body of experts? It seems clear that "reasonable," in the law,
means something more than a view held by a legally sane person.
It is also obvious that a legislature is "entitled to learn by trial
and error, and to settle for less than ideal results." 55 If this be so,
then the judge could possibly look to "logic" to justify his decision.
Conclusions obtained by logic are decided by premises that entail
value judgments. Even if the logic were formally valid, the conclusion
could still be false if the premise were invalid. Furthermore, if
reason is, as Coke said, "the life of law," the problem remains whether
the "reason" has been developed through "study, observation, and ex52.

COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE

44 (L.K. Cohen ed. 1960).

53. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON

LEGAL HISTORY 97
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perience" or through one's natural instinct. On this point, the judge
might be confused. His method for developing a premise may not
have been tested for reasonableness.56 His reason and his reasoning
are not necessarily synonymous. Reasoning does not automatically
produce reasonable results nor can it be said that the conclusion has,
in fact, resulted from reason.57
Would it, for example, be logical to treat Negroes inhumanely if
the judge determines that Caucasians are made happier thereby, and
that the happiness of Caucasians is the most valuable objective of
the predominantly Caucasian society? Would it be reasonable? Is
this what Pound might label "jurisprudence of conceptions"? Is
the syllogistic deduction satisfactory when implemented by the equal
protection clause? Does equal protection permit the premise that the
well-being of Caucasians can be a dominant objective? Logic and
reasoning cannot be the sole methods used in reaching the conclusion.
If the path taken to the conclusion is to be reasonable the judge
must begin and follow through with abstracts implemented by empirical studies of social, economic, and political conditions. The abstracts must be made applicable to reality.
Perhaps what is meant by reasonablenessis the degree of tolerance
for differences in opinion, a tolerance that at times becomes quite
narrow in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, for instance when a threat to national security is demonstrated. Many,
in a nation dedicated to freedom, will do violence to Voltaire's "defend to the death" proposition when their security has been threatened.581 Differences in opinion then become "unreasonable" and
Pound's "jurisprudence of conceptions" 59 comes into play to destroy
60
a vital freedom.
Not since Justice McReynold's dissent in Nebbia v. New York6l
has the "wisdom" of legislative enactments, as distinguished from "reasonableness," been admittedly subject to judicial review.62 But "wisdom" and "reasonableness" are not so easily divorced.
Justice Holmes and Justice Frankfurter are often lauded for their
ability to distinguish between constitutional standards and personal
preferences.
56.

POUND,

LAW

FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON

46 (1960).

57. Ibid.
58. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); THE GREAT RIGHTS
117-18 (Cahn ed. 1963) (speech by Douglas, J.).
59. POUND, op. cit. supra note 56, at 47.
60. THE GREAT RIGwrtS, Op. cit. supra note 58.
61. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
62. Even in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) the Court was careful to find
that equal protection goes only as far as "invidious discrimination" and not into
the legislative chambers.
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In Lochner v. New York, 63 Holmes contended that the Constitution does not incorporate Spencer's Social Statics, a very remarkable
statement if, as many believe, Holmes shared most of Spencer's beliefs.64 Yet in discussing the irrelevance from a constitutional standpoint, of economic theories of laissez faire versus governmental intervention, Holmes said that if put to a personal choice he would elect
to "study it further and long before making up [his] mind." Other
cases tend to demonstrate that Holmes' sympathy with the laissez faire
theories was subject to numerous exceptions where his humanitarianism was touched. 65
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Dennis v. United States66
says he disagrees personally with the legislative evaluation behind the
Smith Act. He would brand the act as unwise, even dangerous, yet
constitutional as applied in Dennis. He would argue for an open
society, yet the Smith Act and the Dennis case tend to close it, in
part. So some would say that Frankfurter distinguishes between
wisdom and constitutionality, but his later opinion in Communist
Party of America v. Subversive Activities Control Board67 gives us an
inkling that he was not entirely out of sympathy with Smith Act supporters. Frankfurter has made a personal choice -developed a personal theory of so-called impersonal judicial review.68 Frankfurter
could find foreign domination of the Communist Party of America
63. 198 U. S. 45 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
64. See BIDDLE, JUsTIcE HoLMEs, NATURAL

LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT 10

(1961).
65. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart where Holmes said dissenting: "I should
have thought that if we were to introduce our own moral conceptions where in
my opinion they do not belong, this [child labor] was preeminently a case for
upholding the exercise of all its powers by the United States." 247 U.S. at 280
(1918). For a comparison of the Holmesian approach to the commerce clause
where humanitarian considerations were not so evident, see Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) where he dissented from a holding that the
Antitrust Act could be applied to a company that gained a controlling interest in
two railroads operating parallel lines. "I assume, for the purpose of discussion,
although it would be a great and serious step to take, that in some case that
seemed to it to need heroic measures, Congress might regulate not only commerce,
but instruments of commerce or contracts the bearing of which upon commerce
would be only indirect." 193 U.S. at 402 (1904).
Is Holmes to be condemned or admired for this incursion of emotion in
Hammer? Were not his brethren in the majority more faithful to "objective adjudication" than he was? After all it takes a strong character to blot out the
image of a fourteen-year-old child working sixty hours a week in a factory, and to
decide the case as an "objective" matter of the division of power between state
and federal authority.
66. 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
67. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
68.

See

FRANKFURTER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 436

(Westin

ed. 1963).
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that was sufficient to "balance away" first amendment freedoms.
Douglas, dissenting, was hard put to find a reason to balance away the
rights of the individual. Was Douglas injecting his own personal
views and beliefs into the case while Frankfurter remained judicially
aloof? Or could it be that Frankfurter was applying his view of government and law? And why is his view any more correct than
Douglas'? Both, after much thought, had to make a value choice as
to the role of a judge. Neither has done violence to his oath of office.
The judge's ability to tolerate as reasonable, opinions with which
he personally differs is directly proportional to the importance he attaches to the matter. Frankfurter dissented in Baker although he
called malapportioned legislatures "monsters of ingenuity." But he
wrote the majority opinion granting relief in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 69
where Negroes were gerrymandered out of representation in city government. In his dissent in Baker, Frankfurter explained the difference
on the basis that Gomillion involved a "constitutional imperative."
Without implying any criticism whatsoever, could one speculate that
Frankfurter's life-long commitment to Negro rights made a fifteenth
amendment claim "imperative" and one under the fourteenth, "political"?
In terms of reapportionment, the state may be expected to defend
the "reasonableness" of diluting the challenger's vote by a ratio
170:1 in terms of a number of traditional arguments.
The legislature must not only represent people but also regions.70
It must balance group and economic interests. Nevertheless, "people
not trees, acres, economic or other interests, vote." If areas are not
represented but only the people who live there, and if their vote is
given more weight than others - why? Is it because they have more
needs than others or because they are Mill's wise and virtuous electorate? Is it "reasonable" to presume that either of these propositions
is true? The. plaintiff might argue that the very purpose of an elected
legislature is to express the consensus of a group. A perfectly balanced
legislature would be in complete equilibrium and hence produce no
laws. The state would then bring in "sane" opinion and history. The
apportionment statute was passed, or left undisturbed, by a majority
of legislators who are, by current legal standards, competent. Since
our mythical state has continued to exist for one hundred twenty
years on this basis and attained a fair degree of prosperity, their
"reasonableness" is borne out.
What legislative makeup should be impermissible under the equal
protection requirement, only that adopted by madmen? The reasons
69. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
70. Bingham, Legislative Representation by

Towns, Yale Law

Report 4

(summer 1964).
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advanced for supporting the state's dilution concept "disappear into
thin air" when examined.71 Why protect rural minority interest and
not Negro minority interest? Protection of minorities is implicit in
another part of the political system, the Constitution.
"[IT]here is every reason to believe that a more equitable system
of representation will increase vitality of local self-government
.... ,72 Why argue history; "the system seems to be doing all right"?
Prosperity is relative. Who is to say that our mythical state could not
have become a virtual Utopia if only a "reasonable" apportionment
scheme had existed? Our purpose at this point is not to study these
arguments in depth, but to show that the judge will have difficulty in
reasoning his way to a clear-cut answer. If he takes "reasonable" to
mean "sane opinion," he might as well delete the equal protection
clause from the Constitution. If he understands it to mean more, he
will soon find logic an inadequate method for reaching a solution
to the case before him.
"The Intent of the Framers"
Of course, strict reliance on the text and deductive reasoning is
not all that is included in the classicist's approach to the Constitution.
Assume that he does not consider words in vacuo, but instead looks
to the "intent of the framers." What then will be the result?
The first, and probably the oldest, rule of statutory construction
is that when a statute is clear on its face the plain meaning must prevail; hence, there is no need for judicial interpretation. This assumes,
of course, that the symbol is connected to the specific referent. Possibly the connection is conventional, but are there not a number
of conventions used in assigning meaning to words? If it is the convention of the audience, who then is the audience of the Constitution?
In contract law, what is the convention of the mind of the "reasonable man"? What conventions must a judge use when the meaning
does not seem to relate to the convention of either party to the contract? Possibly contract law can be answered in terms of the convention of the offeror, just as constitutional interpretation might look
to the convention of the drafter, the law-giver. 73 Assuming that the
71. Emerson, Reapportionment inConnecticut, Yale Law Report 5, 7 (summer
1964).
72. Ibid.

73. This discussion could further be compounded by inserting the perfect
ambiguity. See State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550 (1884). An act of the legislature
forbade the sale of "spirituous liquors" within three miles of "Mount Zion church
in Gaston County." There were two Mount Zion churches in Gaston County, and

apparently not willing to say that the legislature might have meant both, the
court found the act ambiguous thus presumably allowing spirituous liquor sales

throughout all of Gaston County.
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intent of the framers is discoverable, is it sufficient to bind the
courts? Should a distinction be clearly drawn by the courts between
the purpose of the Constitution and the intent of the framers? 7- And
does history accurately reveal guides to intent?75 It is often said that
the Napoleonic Code set out the law. "Citizen, what is your condition? Are you a farmer? Then consult the Chapter on Agriculture."' 6 The "citizen" would have little success if he were looking
for the Chapter on Agriculture in the United States Constitution, for
the very nature of the document precludes most specifics, but instead
speaks in general language. So in dealing with generalities the discovery of intent becomes even more difficult. But attempts continue to
be made.
The framers of the Constitution were not an amorphous mass, but
individual men with individual likes and dislikes. In fact, they were
so individualisticthat they formed their own nation, a very un-British
activity. The final contract by which they, and those to come after,
were to be bound was, however, born of compromise causing grave
disappointment among some delegates who condemned it as a "mere
makeshift."77
By its own terms the Constitution was to be effective only when
ratified by conventions held in at least nine states. New Hampshire
was the ninth state to ratify, but since advocates of the new Constitution realized that the infant nation could not succeed without the
support of New York and Virginia, no attempt was made to proclaim
the Constitution effective until eleven states had actually ratified.78
Well over one thousand delegates participated in the various state
conventions,' 9 and their intentions would seem equally as important
as the intention of any one of the delegates to the national convention.
Did Charles Pinckney, for example, intend any specific section to
mean the same thing when he introduced it, as Abraham Baldwin intended when he consented to a slight change in its wording, or as
the New Hampshire ratifying convention intended upon ratification?
Each may have had a completely different conception of the over-all
effect of the specific provision. The only thing definitely agreed upon
was the bare language adopted.
In the case of the amendments to the Constitution, the problem
is even greater. Each amendment was proposed by two-thirds of each
house of Congress, and ratified by the state legislatures or conventions
74. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-84 (1930).
75. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
76.

Quoted in 1 SCHWARTZ,

THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 2

(1963).

77. Historical Note on the Formation of the Constitution in The Constitution
of The United States of America, S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952).
78. Id. at 14.
79. Ibid.
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of three-fourths of the states. So many more "intents" were involved
in the final product.8 0
Probably none could fully understand every provision of the document. In Pollock v. FarmersLoan & Trust Co.1 the Court in holding
the 1894 income tax unconstitutional had to examine article I, section
9 of the Constitution. The question involved was whether a tax on
the income from real property was a "direct" tax within the meaning
of the Constitution. The Court found it was. After reviewing what he
called the historical circumstances attending the framing and adoption
of the Constitution, Mr. Justice Fuller for the majority concluded,
"[T]he distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well
understood by the framers of the Constitution and those who adopted
it.,,2

One must compare this comment with Madison's Notes of the
constitutional convention: "Mr. King asked what was the precise
meaning of direct taxation. No one answered." 8 3 But even in the
case of provisions they understood, it can only be expected that their
ideas about application extended to their past experience, contemporary problems, and the reasonably predictable future. Furthermore,
as all politicians, the framers of both the amendments and the original
Constitution could not always say exactly what they intended. The
FederalistPapers,although generally accepted as authoritative by the
courts in regard to constitutional interpretation,4 was essentially a
political document designed to "sell" the new Constitution. 5
80. For example, according to the "conspiracy theory," the drafters of the
fourteenth amendment used the word "person" in the equal protection clause,
rather than "citizen," for the secret purpose of including private corporations
within its protection. Although many historians discount this theory, it is true
that the Court subsequently held the clause applicable to corporations with surprisingly little discussion, in light of the fact that most informed opinion at the
time had been to the contrary. Coverage by the equal protection clause allowed
corporations to share in the benefits of the judicially fabricated doctrine of
"freedom-to-contract," by which they were "protected" from such things as
maximum hour and child labor legislation. Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938). It is hard enough to find any
"framers' intent" precise enough to help in the interpretation of linguistic ambiguities in ambivalent fact situations when the framers are straightforward. How
would it be possible to do so if they were trying to hide their true intentions at
the same time?
81. 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
82. Id. at 573. (Emphasis added.)
83. 5 ELLIOT, DEBATEs ON THE AnOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 451

(1866).
84. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418-19 (1821).
85. CAHILL, JUDIcIAL LEGISLATION 11 (1952); Woffard, The Blinding Light:
The Use of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 Cm. L. REv. 502, 513
(1964).
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The framers apparently did not "intend" that later generations
look for their "intent." The idea of discovering the intention of the
framers during such trying times would be confusing at best.8 6 There
was no verbatim transcript kept at the convention, and the papers
compiled by Chairman Washington were far from complete. Madison's Notes were often written or altered after the fact.8 7 "Intent" has
been generally found in articles, pamphlets, and letters written by the
delegates, usually without regard to whether they were written during,
before, or after the convention, or for what purpose and to what
audience. This is not to say that the "purpose" or an idea of what
the framers had in mind is not available. But as a tool for resolving
questions of sufficient ambiguity to reach the United States Supreme
Court, "framers' intent" is of little value.
Wesberry demonstrated the fruitlessness of proponents of differing
constitutional interpretations relying on history for support. Justice
Black, for the Court, arrayed an impressive amount of historical
evidence demonstrating that the founders intended that United States
representatives should represent districts of equal population within
a given state. Justice Harlan, in dissent, amassed as equally an impressive amount of materials demonstrating that they intended no
such thing. It has been pointed out that some of Harlan's historical
material can easily be read to support the majority's opinion more
than his own.83 But undaunted, Harlan, in Reynolds, again pointed
to history to support his contention. Fortunately, the Court this time
was not enticed into matching him pound for pound with "historical
evidence." Possibly actions would better demonstrate the founders'
reasoning with regard to a particular constitutional provision. Does
the conduct of the drafter aid the reader in determining which application best suits a specific provision of a written document?
Justice Harlan would seem to place great emphasis upon the
practice as well as intent of the framers: "The years following 1868,
far from indicating a developing awareness of the applicability of
the Fourteenth Amendment to problems of apportionment, demonstrated precisely the reverse." ' 9 Harlan then traces the entire history
of malapportionment of state legislatures presumably on the theory
that since it has worked "up till now," why change it? Or, "if they

86. Even today a court armed with the appropriate legislative journals, few
and far between to be sure, plus impressive sounding intrinsic aids such as
Ejusdem generis or Expressio unius is still quite often unable to clearly understand "intent." See generally Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes,
24 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1940).
87.
88.

Woffard, supra note 85, at 504-05.
Note, The Supreme Court 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REv. 179, 245 (1964).

89. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362, 1405 (1964).
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got away with it this long, it must be all right." Harlan is advocating
an examination of the conduct of the congressmen who framed the
fourteenth amendment. If their conduct is relevant then surely our
founding fathers' conduct must also be examined and given its due
weight. Does action demonstrate intent?
The world of the founding fathers was replete with contradictions. The founders' dream of an open society apparently did not
include the Negro, which must forever leave a certain tarnish on
their democratic and libertarian ideals.
Professor Leonard Levy in The Legacy of Suppression argues that
the framers of the first amendment's "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," did not practice
what they preached. Prior to, during, and after its embodiment in
the Constitution, the concept was not put into practice. 90 In 1798,
just ten years after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress passed,
and the courts enforced, the Sedition Act, an abridgment of freedom
of speech that dwarfs by comparison the present Smith Act as interpreted and the most questionable practices of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Under the Sedition Act a member of the
United States House of Representatives was imprisoned for saying
that President Adams had a "continual grasp for power." 91 Numerous
convictions would no doubt have followed the recent Presidential campaign if the Sedition laws were still in effect and enforced as in the
days of the founders.
The press, too, came under close governmental scrutiny even
though presumably protected by the first amendment. Any statements
that could be construed as having placed the Government in a bad
light in the public eye was considered seditious libel subjecting the
writer to criminal prosecution. 92 Levy concludes that the colonists,
the framers, and the people did not have nor consider having a tradition of freedom of speech. 93 Their actions all too clearly support
Levy's conclusions.
Professor Levy points to a book written by a New York lawyer
and published in 1800, 9 4 in which the author advocated freedom of
90.

LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 6 (1960).

91. He was Matthew Lyon of Vermont, who was sentenced to four months in
jail and fined $I,000. He was treated brutally as a prisoner. HAINES, THE RoLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, 161-62

(1960).

92.

LEvY, op. cit. supra note 90, at 10.
93. Id. at 283. Although a few of our founders were more than willing to
stand up against the Sedition Act. See James Madison's address of Jan. 23, 1799
cited in Garrison v. Louisiana, 33 U.S.L. Week 4019, 4024 (Nov. 24, 1964).
94.

WoRTmfANN,

A TREATISE CONCERNING

POLITICAL INQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY

OF THE PRESS (1800).
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expression, as a great masterpiece that Thomas Jefferson "should
have written." Professor Willmore Kendall reviewing Levy states:
"[I]t is a book Jefferson could not have written even if he had tried
and the book John Stuart Mill later tried to write but did not write
as well." 95
Should the present be guided by the noble ideals of the founders
or by their deviations during the nation's infancy from the standards
they established to guide the search for the ideal? The question would
seem to answer itself.
It is not only impossible to use "framers' intent" as an effective
tool for answering precise legal questions, but it is probably just as
well that the courts cannot. 96 As Max Radin pointed out, legislators,
and presumably delegates to a constitutional convention, are authorized only to legislate; it then becomes the task of a judge to
9
interpret.
7 Or as Justice Holmes said: 98
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century
and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove
that they had created a nation.
The Role of "Precedent"
A final argument employed by the classicist is that the Court can
be guided by "precedent" to a precise constitutional adjudication in
any given case.
The probability of any event of relative complexity precisely duplicating itself in history is infinitesimal. One can usually find an
analogy between the most divergent happenings and relevant distinguishing factors in the most apparently similar cases. Even if the
application of precedent to a given case were clear, in constitutional
adjudication, why should the Court follow precedent? What reason
is there to think that courts were any better equipped twenty or one
hundred years ago than they are now?
In no other discipline, save perhaps some religions, is the wisdom
of the past deemed to absolutely bind the present. In fact, the es95.

Kendall, Book Review, 16

STAN.

L. REV. 755, 767 (1964).

96. "Intent" is quite often submerged under the so-called plain meaning rule.
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
97. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
98. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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sence of most learned disciplines is to improve upon the wisdom of
the past.
The argument for adherence to precedent is that it provides the
certainty and stability necessary to a workable system of law. 99 This
has merit within limits. It does serve as a guide for judges and as an
aid in their deliberation. But it should not act as a dead hand
stifling change.100
Constitutional adjudication differs from statutory or common law
interpretation in that the statute or common law decision, if bad,
can be more readily changed elsewhere. But a constitution is by
design difficult to amend. It would be of little value if it were otherwise. If the Congress is silent after a "bad" decision on the Constitution, that silence, as it possibly is in statutory or common law
cases, cannot be deemed approval. One-third plus one of the United
States Senate can keep a constitutional amendment from being proposed. Thirty-four senators perhaps from the seventeen smallest states
can block an amendment. A bare majority of the legislatures, perhaps malapportioned, of the thirteen smallest states can prevent ratification.1°1 The fact then that a Supreme Court decision has not been
changed by constitutional amendment cannot be used to demonstrate
approval by the people. In the area of constitutional adjudication
where the very contract for existence is in question, the Court has the
duty to correct its own mistakes.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSICISTS' APPROACH TO REAPPORTIONMENT

Perhaps our mythical judge listening patiently to our discussion is
becoming desperate. He would like to utilize precedent anyway, and
perhaps even "framers' intent" together with his reasoning power.
Since there is a library full of reported cases and an almost infinite
number of ways of putting them together and reading them with regard to a given case, let us briefly consider precedent as it was used by
the Court in Baker and The 1964 Reapportionment Cases. In so doing, we naturally will find it necessary to use some deductive reasoning
and perhaps find "the framers' intent" unavoidable as well.
In Baker the plaintiffs' complaint was that their representatives to
the Tennessee Legislature represented more people than representatives from some of the other districts. Their district was drawn so
as to contain more people than other districts having the same representation. Therefore, their own vote carried less weight proportionately in electing a representative to the legislature than did the votes
of other Tennesseans.
99.
100.
101.

2 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 104-14 (1959).
POUND, THE HiSroRY AND SYSTM OF THE COMAON LAW 62 (1939).
U.S. CONST. art. V.

See
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The Tennessee Constitution requires apportionment of state senators and representatives every ten years. 10 2 The apportionment shall
be among counties or districts according to the number of qualified
voters in each. There had been, prior to Baker, no apportionment
since 1901, yet the state population growth and shift had created great
voting disparities in the various districts. The Tennessee Legislature
refused to follow the commands of its own state law and failed to
reapportion itself. The Tennessee Supreme Court10 3 held that the
matter was not one to be settled in the courts, but at best in the
"political thicket." The Tennessee Legislature was districted by the
Tennessee Legislature in violation of the Tennessee Constitution.
Tennessee courts would not interfere. The acts then of the various
state branches of government, state action, did result in the plaintiffs being treated differently from other citizens in the state. After
the state courts turned a deaf ear, plaintiffs moved for relief into the
federal courts charging among other things a denial of equal protection contrary to the fourteenth amendment.
The three-judge district court dismissed the complaint on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and plaintiffs' failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.O4 The Supreme Court found
that the federal courts had jurisdiction and the plaintiffs had standing to raise the equal protection question. Even Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, conceded that "the District Court had jurisdiction
in the very restricted sense of power to determine whether it could
adjudicate the claim."' 5 If the plaintiffs had properly invoked the
equal protection clause and the Court had jurisdiction, why should it
not adjudicate the claim? One answer given was because it was "in
reality" a "political question,"106 which has been recognized as a
nonjusticiable controversy.' 0 7

102. TENN. CONST. art. II, §§4, 5, 6 (1870).
103. Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 920 (1956).
104. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
105. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
106. Briefly stated a political question is one that arises when a party invokes
a right that may well be protected by the Constitution, but the Court deems it
to be not within its function to decide. The term itself does not refer to whether
the question involves "politics," but rather to the fact that, in such cases, the
Court usually finds that the question is best decided by one of the "political"
branches of the Government, legislative or executive. See Finklestein, Judicial
Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1924).
107. "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or
to invoke the ample powers of Congress." Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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There is nothing in the text of the Constitution about "political
questions." One of the theories, however, under which the "political
question" concept has been invoked is that it is implicit in certain
sections of the document that some matters are best left to the political
branches.103 The guarantee clause, as noted previously, leaves some
doubts whether the Supreme Court or some other agency of the
"United States" is to guarantee the states a republican form of government. But plaintiffs did not invoke the guarantee clause, they
invoked "equal protection," which had never been deemed to involve a "political question." If the equal protection guarantee has
been abridged it is normally the Court's function to interpret the
extent of the abridgment.
It would seem, at this point, that the burden is on the negative
and the arguments advanced for nonjusticiability by Frankfurter and
Harlan should be considered. Frankfurter first turned to his earlier
opinion in Colegrove v. Green 0 9 to demonstrate the "political" nature of the problem. But Colegrove did not fit too neatly into the
facts of Baker. For one thing, only three justices concurred in Frankfurter's plurality opinion in Colegrove; Mr. Justice Rutledge seemed
to be more in agreement with the dissent, although he concurred in
the result of the four-man majority of the seven-man Court. Furthermore, Colegrove dealt with congressional reapportionment, rather
than state legislative, and the textual support of article I, section 4110
used by Frankfurter in Colegrove to strengthen his "political" argument, was absent in Baker.
There was, however, considerable precedent for the proposition
that the guarantee clause inevitably involved "political questions."
None of the cases so holding, however, involved reapportionment and
the landmark guarantee clause cases were decided within settings of
extreme political pressure on the Court not to decide.l13 Nevertheless,
108. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1959) in SE.LEcT ESSAYs ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 463, 468 (2d ed. 1963).
109. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
110. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Places of chusing Senators." For Frankfurter, this was an exclusive commitment of the Congressional reapportionment problem to Congress. 328 U.S. at
554 (1946).
111. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) involved "Dorr's Rebellion,"
see 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY 185-95 (1926).
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867) asked the Court to challenge the
Reconstruction Acts, a course of conduct that resulted in impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and an issue that the court also sidestepped in Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra at 460-65,
473-74, 480-84, 487-88.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA I

REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

the majority over a thought-provoking objection by Justice Douglas'"12
conceded this point, 113 but separated the guarantee clause from equal
protection in the process. Frankfurter, on the other hand, maintained
that the guarantee clause was unavoidably involved in the case and
could not be separated from the equal protection clause.
What he was saying was that states' "rights" are protectable in
state courts under state law. If a litigant has received the full protection of state law and has been treated the same as other litigants in
similarstatus, then the matter should rest at that level, for no federal
violation has been demonstrated.1 4 According to Frankfurter, equal
protection requires equal treatment only for those who stand in equal
relationship to their government.115 Unless the Court determines the
nature of the republican form of government guaranteed to the states,
it cannot, argued Frankfurter, know whether these plaintiffs stand in
the same relationship to that government as the voters in less populous
counties. "[T]o divorce 'equal protection' from 'Republican Form' is
to talk about half a question." 116 The answer by Brennan was that
all citizens stand in equal relationship to their government until some
rational basis is shown for giving them unequal standing." 7
Justice Harlan's objection, not fully developed until Reynolds,
took the same tack but was more for simplifying matters. He seemed
to be troubled by the concept of "political questions," perhaps a
natural product of his apparent classicist leanings. Harlan termed
the majority holding an "adventure in judicial experimentation," but
he preferred to say that there is an exception to the equal protection
clause in the case of legislative apportionment. In the alternative, he
would have found that Tennessee's apportionment did not violate
equal protection. Parenthetically, Harlan's approach to "rationality"
would seem hardly ever to result in an equal protection violation. For
support of his theory, he relied in part on the fact that section 2 of
the fourteenth amendment provides a remedy for the denial of the
vote to any male citizen over twenty-one (not convicted of a crime or

112. It is difficult to understand why the guarantee clause should per se be
classified a "political question." Possibly when a direct clash with the body
politic might result or other political question ingredients are involved then the
rationale is sound, otherwise blanket refusal to decide cases under the guarantee
clause on "political question" grounds seems odd. See Bonfield, Baker v. Carr:
New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 245, 246-52 (1962).
113. But see Brennan's footnote 48, Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222-23 (1962).
114. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13 (1944) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
115. Id. at 16.
116. 369 U.S. at 301 (1962).
117. Who then has the judicially manageable standards? This, the issue of
"reapportionment cases," will be discussed further, infra.
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rebellion): reduction of the state's total representation in Congress. 118
In Saunders v. Wilkins," 9 section 2 was held to be nonjusticiable.
Harlan seems to imply this, but apparently believes section 2 demonstrates a textual commitment of the problem to Congress. Section 2
does not in its terms express whether the reduction contemplated is
to be accomplished by Congress or the Court. Congress has never utilized this power, if indeed it is theirs, and for reasons later discussed,
is not likely to do so.
Furthermore, can it be said, as Harlan seems to suggest, that a
single activity cannot run afoul of more than one provision in the
Constitution at the same time? Does the law only provide one remedy
or, at times, does it allow for a choice of remedies for a particular
type of wrong?
Amendment fifteen expressly prohibits denial of vote on the
basis of race, yet presumably such a denial could result in the reduction of the state's representation under section 2 of the fourteenth
amendment. Harlan's argument relating to section 2 seems to come
full circle.
Harlan next looked to "intent of the framers" for further support.
In Reynolds, he filled numerous pages of the United States Reports
with selected statements of selected individuals connected with the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment. As an example, Harlan
quotes from Thaddeus Stevens to lend support to his section 2
20
argument:
If any state shall exclude any of her male citizens from the elective franchise, or abridge that right, she shall forfeit her right
to representation in the same proportion. The effect of this
provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal
suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the National government, both
legislative and executive.
In analyzing Stevens, Harlan says, "In unmistakable terms, he recognized the power of a state to withhold the right to vote."' 2'
The
precise language of section 2 provides for the reduction of representation when the right to vote "is denied to any of the male inhabitants
of such State being twenty one years of age and citizens of the
United States . . . except for participation in rebellion, or other
118. There is a general implementation statute for §2. Although strong in
language the actual threat to a state's representation in Congress has never borne
fruit. See 2 U.S.C. §6 (1958); for a thorough study of §2 see Bonfield, The Right
To Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment,
46 CoP.N. L.Q. 108 (1960).
119. 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946).
120. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362, 1400 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
121. Id. at 1400. (Emphasis added.)
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crimes."2 2

It would appear, then, by Harlan's logic, that section 2
recognizes "in unmistakable terms" the right to participate in rebellion or other crimes.
Only one item in Harlan's "historical analysis" actually pertains
to state legislative apportionment. In the course of the debate concerning the readmission of Florida into the Union, Representative
Farnsworth objected to Florida's proposed constitution, which he
alleged established a malapportioned legislature. Mr. Butler's response, which Harlan found "particularly illuminating," was that
the Florida Constitution had been submitted to several committees
that found it "republican and proper. ' ' 1 23 Of course, at this point in
time the fourteenth amendment had not been adopted. From threads
such as these, Harlan weaves an historical argument he deems persuasive."4
Mr. Justice Brennan, couching his opinion in traditional legal
language, first attempts to synthesize the "political question" cases.
He decides that there can be no particular category of cases that are
"political" per se, but that "political questions" are identified in any
given case, by six criteria. 25 All except one, or perhaps two such criteria are a function of separation of powers within the federal government. In the case of reapportionment, no other branch of the
federal government has decided or indicated a disposition to decide
the matter, and no convincing arguments have been advanced to
demonstrate that the Constitution gives another branch the exclusive right to decide.
The two potentially applicable criteria set forth by Brennan
pertain to manageable judicial standards:

122. See Bonfield, The Right To Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 118, at 132-33. (Emphasis added.)
123. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 120, at 1403-05.
124. It is interesting to note that much of Harlan's "legislative history" in
Reynolds dealt with the fears of some congressmen that the fourteenth amendment would not be ratified if the states thought it required Negro suffrage. This
suffrage was, of course, expressly guaranteed in the next amendment. Harlan
has a disturbing tendency in the Reapportionment Cases to point to the early
treatment of Negroes as constitutional justification for unequal treatment of
others. In Wesberry, Harlan points to the fact that the original Constitution
provided for the enumeration of three-fifths of the slaves, to support his proposition that in this particular republican form of government people need not
vote for their representatives. One wonders just how many measures the antebellum Southern congressmen supported for the benefit of the slaves they "represented." There is by no means any attempt here to cast an unfavorable light upon
Harlan's record in protecting minorities, especially Negroes. That record is
exemplary! This makes it all the more disturbing when he calls upon the
darkest portions of American history to justify positions in other cases.
125. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss3/1

30

1964]

Laughlin and Baldwin: The Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the Constitutional Adjudica
THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES: A STUDY

(1) "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stand'
ards for resolving it.1 26
(2) "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
1 27
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."
If legal standards are not "discoverable," it means, in effect, that
they cannot be developed in a fashion that the particular observer
feels appropriate for a court. In other words, the Court must make
a "policy determination" that the particular observer feels is not
proper for it to make. Stripped of nonessentials, it becomes quite
obvious that both tests merely ask the Court to decide the ultimate
question formulated in the initial premise: should the Court decide
the case? The majority was not willing to divorce itself of the protection of traditional analysis of legal problems,128 and after traversing
all the oft-traveled classical roads of deductive reasoning, framers'
intent, precedent, and past practices they had come full circle. But
at some point, whether hidden or not, the Court was called upon to
make a policy decision whether the interests of society would be served
best by its entering the state legislative apportionment arena. The
Court had to be concerned with the events, not the language, with
behavior, not traditional rules.329 This is not one of those situations
that Holmes said involved a substitution of the preferences of the
justices for that of the legislature, nor a deemphasizing of the role
of the latter. This concept assumes that the Court protects the contract for a law and society that are in a constant state of change, with
law generally lagging, and it is the Court that must demand adherence
to the contract from all concerned. Where, as in reapportionment, the
legislature fails to abide by the contract, the Court is "compelled to
act in vindication" of the rights infringed.130 This concept of "adaptation of positive law to social change"'' is necessary, although not
always articulated. Hence Brennan's answers, too, are cloaked in
classical legalistic "analysis." "Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been
126. Id. at 217. The "manageable" part of criteria number one presented a
subsidiary issue in the case. Frankfurter believed the Court could not enforce its
decrees in this area. The brief history since Baker seems to be proving him wrong,
but all the evidence is not in. See Note, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 YALE.J. 968, 1006-29 (1963).
127. Baker v. Carr, supra note 125, at 217.
128. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 78-80

(1962).
129. Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REv. 317
(1960).
130. See Goldberg, Equity and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205,

216 (1964).
131. Yntema, supra note 129, at 329.
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open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination
' ' 132
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.
Malapportionment had come about by legislative inaction in the
face of population shifts. It was as Mr. Justice Clark put it, "a crazy
quilt" discrimination not only against urban voters as compared
to rural, but also between rural voters similarly situated. The
legislature had defied its own state constitution and most commentators were hard put to find a valid rationale to support the Tennessee
Legislature's actions. 33 At this point, it would seem that the "sane
opinion" approach to equal protection would almost have been adequate to decide the case against the state.
For Frankfurter, however, the problem was more complex; he
would, no doubt, have conceded that a case could conceivably exist
where a court might without too much difficulty say the apportionment plan reflects no policy. But he recognized that in the "real
world" a state legislature whose apportionment was declared unconstitutional would be in no big rush to drastically readjust itself. It might
in successive steps improve its apportionment ever so slightly, so that
eventually the Court would be called upon the establish in a rather
precise manner, just where the unequal apportionment became a
violation of equal protection. This, then, is what troubled him in
his dissent; this then is why he insisted the Court would have to come
to grips with the guarantee clause in order to set the outer limits of
governmental action in reapportionment. It seems likely that Frankfurter foresaw that the probable outcome of asserting judicial competence over the reapportionment cases would be the "one man, one
vote" rule of Reynolds.
Why did Frankfurter foresee this, if indeed he did? "Standards
under the equal protection clause are well developed," said Brennan well developed in that they required legal distinctions to be "reasonable." But we have seen that "reasonableness" is an extremely
underdeveloped concept.
Yet one aspect of equal protection was well developed, at least by
implication. That is that equal protection investigations start from
a presumption of equality among men. The standard of reasonableness may vary considerably depending upon such factors as whether
the Court sees the particular state action as being "mainly" in the
economic field as in Williamson v. Lee Opticala4 or as involving an
"individual" right as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.135 The distinctions
132. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
133. See Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government:
The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 711 (1963).
134. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
135. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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drawn may be tenuous and unacceptable to many as in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 136 Plessy v. Ferguson,1 37 or Betts v.
Brady. 38 But one thing is common to all equal protection cases; the
Court starts from a presumption that all men are equal until a "reasonable" basis is shown for considering them unequal. Yet Justice
Frankfurter would have denied even that in Baker. The equal protection clause guarantees equal protection only for those who stand
in equal relation to their government, he said. Frankfurter would put
upon the complainants in Baker the burden of proving, through the
guarantee clause, that they were equal to their fellow Tennesseans
before they could even have their case considered under the equal
protection clause. This despite the fact that it has been consistently
held that even aliens are entitled to the benefit of equal protection.
Why then did Frankfurter take this unusual position? Probably
because he realized that once the equality base was admitted in the
apportionment area the proponents of unequal districts would be hard
pressed to establish any grounds for deviation.
It is interesting to note that those who speak favorably of representing areas, balancing rural against urban vote, or economic against
other group interests, never go beyond generalities - never attempt to
demonstrate how a system of unequal districts, existing or proposed,
would in practice tend to produce better results than equal districts.
If a simple state model is constructed, containing one clearly
defined urban-suburban area and the remainder rural, with the urbansuburban area covering fifteen per cent of the land mass but eightyfive percent of the population, some of the difficulties in putting a
"balanced" apportionment plan into effect begin to appear. Should
each area be equally represented? If so, why? Does one receive more
representation that the other? Which one? How much? Why?
Fi gure 1

15%
(population)

IM
136.
137.
138.

Urban-Suburban

E

l Rural

336 U.S. 106 (1949).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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Assume in the rural district that there are farming, mining, and
timber interests, while in the urban district there are manufacturing
and commerce. Should the rural area receive three-fifths of the representation while urban receives only two-fifths? Why? Would it make
a difference if the manufacturing interests added more to the economy
than the other four combined? If so, in what proportion should the
votes be allocated for these interests? To further complicate the problem, assume also that the mines, timberlands, and thirty per cent of
the farmlands are owned by people who live in the city or suburbs.
Those living in the rural area have an average of twenty-five per cent
of their wealth in the securities of various companies located in the
city, with some of the rural dwellers having all of their wealth so
situated.
The group interests of the unionized miners tend to blend with
those of the unionized factory worker. The suburban capitalist tends
to have interest in common with the rural capitalist, the city-dwelling
farm owner with the rural-dwelling farmer, and so on. In actuality,
the situation is far more complex than stated. Cities tend to blend
into suburbs while other cities spring from the suburbs, and small
cities exist in predominantly rural areas. Self-interest knows no
special district or line. This, then, seems to give life to Chief Justice
Warren's statement that people, and only people, vote.
When one argues that a given area should have more representation, thus granting to those in that area greater voting power, there
can be only two reasons why: (1) those people are wiser or more
virtuous; they are Mill's prepared electorate; or (2) they have more
needs. In our current setting neither proposition is demonstrably
correct.
The chief distinction usually made when discussing unequal legislative districts is between urban-suburban and rural voters. The distinction exists in fact because of population shifts toward urban areas;
the rationale being these are the only groups that, readily or effectively,
can be separated geographically.
Are then the rural inhabitants Mill's chosen? There is no evidence to support such a proposition. The folklore, for example, that
rural dwellers are more "virtuous" than urban dwellers, does not seem
to stand up when it is pointed out that per capita more crimes of
13 9
violence are committed in rural areas than in urban-suburban areas.
Even if this cold fact could be ignored, "virtue" is a rather ephemeral concept upon which to base legislative action.
139.

See

RECKLESS,

THE CRIME PROBLEM 43-65

(1955). It seems that "crimes

against the person are somewhat disproportionately higher in rural than in urban
areas and that crimes against property are very much disproportionally higher in
urban than in rural districts." Id. at 59.
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As to needs, does the farmer "need" roads more than the citydweller "needs" freeways? Does the farmer need economic aid more
than the unemployed, the small businessman, or the handicapped of
the city? Do the "rural minorities" need protection from the
"tyranny" of the "urban majority" more than Negro minorities need
protection from the "tyranny" of the white majority?
What Frankfurter was saying throughout his dissent in Baker,
when he spoke of the "mathematical quagmire," the lack of "accepted
legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to draw upon for
making judicial judgments" and the "incommensurable factors of
policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles," was that once you
depart from a pure population base, how in the world do you tell a
reasonable apportionment plan from an unreasonable one? Since one
would presume that legislators and attorneys are not on the average
a great deal smarter than judges, Frankfurter must have realized that
if the tables were once turned, the proponents of unequal districting
would be hard pressed to demonstrate any rational pattern in their
actions.
Frankfurter seemed to imply that a legislature, through compromise and experience, could reach a "rational" plan of unequal districts, even though they could not explain to us how it worked. But
even those most dedicated to Holmes' concept that the life of the law
is experience rather than logic, could hardly find unquestioning judicial acceptance of a legislative Gestalt, the basis for a workable system of judicial review.
The same must be said for the argument that states had "prospered" under unequal representation, that malapportionment had not
yet wrecked the system. Dinosaurs with no power of reasoning whatsoever managed to exist for about twice as long as we humans have
made it thus far. Could the same Frankfurter who in Dennis allowed
Congress to abridge free speech at the first hint of a threat to our security, hold that the Court must allow a legislative act completely
unsupportable on logic to totally wreck the state, before it dares to
call it "unreasonable"?
Still Frankfurter's dissent in Baker had a worthwhile effect on
the Court. In Reynolds the Court did not merely rely on the unarticulated but unmistakable premise that all equal protection examinations
begin from a base of equality. In the intervening cases, Gray v.
Sanders and Wesberiy v. Sanders, and in Reynolds as well, the Court
built upon the premise that in this area, the area of political rights,
above all others the American base point is equality. Calling upon
the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution,
the Gettysburg Address, the fifteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth
amendments, the Court showed that American constitutional philosophy had evolved in one direction, toward political equality. Baker
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'1 0
and Reynolds reinforced the "American commitment to equality"
and in so doing placed the burden squarely upon those who would depart from "one man, one vote" to justify such departure.
Then bit-by-bit the Court took apart the traditional rationalizations for unequal apportionment. The analogy to the United States
Senate was inapposite. The Senate was not designed to represent
areas but to represent sovereignties, the original states-nations,
equally in one house. No sovereignty has ever been deemed to reside
in counties or state legislative districts.
Neither area, history, economy, or group interests were valid
rationalizations. The emerging standard was "one man, one vote."
Standard because, despite the protestations of Mr. Justice Stewart, the
Court did not nor could it "freeze forever one theory of political
thought into our Constitution." First of all, no court can ever "freeze"
anything into the Constitution, for what one court can do, another
can undo. But more than that, the Court expressly recognized the
right of a state to depart from the strict population standard, "so

long as the divergences

. . .

are based on legitimate considerations in-

cident to the effectuation of a rational state policy." It found all the
traditional rationalizations, save one, inadequate. But the legislature
that can produce in fact rather than fancy, a "balanced" system of
apportionment, should, under the opinion in Reynolds, be entitled to
a hearing.
THE EFFECT OF A DECISION "NOT To DECIDE"
1

1
Some eminent scholars of our time, such as Professor Wechsler, 4
agree with Marshall's tenet advanced in Cohens v. Virginia142 that
the Court cannot avoid deciding a constitutional question properly
is often the
raised. Others agree with Professor Bickel that discretion
143
better part of valor in constitutional adjudication.
We see little merit in debating the point. When is a constitutional
question properly raised? Wechsler would allow the Court to refuse

to decide questions it deems to be "political.."144

Once that is con-

ceded, the divergence between Wechsler and Bickel narrows, and
perhaps disappears. Both would, it seems, have to concede that the
decision not to decide, is a decision nonetheless.

140.
(1964).
141.

Goldberg, Equity and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 208
Wechsler, supra note 108, at 466-69.

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
144. Wechsler, supra note 108.
142.
143.
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Once again it would appear the layman understands more than
some experts believe. Every freshman law student knows that a denial
of certiorari is "not a decision on the merits." But tell the litigant
who has not prevailed in the circuit court that the Supreme Court has
not decided against him, it has merely "declined to hear his case."
You will say, "yes, it establishes no precedent." Doesn't it? When the
Supreme Court refuses to review a case upholding the use in a
public school of the Pledge of Allegiance, as amended to include
"under God," will not that practice continue in schools throughout
the nation? Suppose you were an attorney about to file a similar suit.
Would you be unaffected by the fact that not even four justices
on the Supreme Court deemed the question worthy of full debate?
Were not the newspapers and airwaves at least partially correct when
they told us that the Supreme Court had "upheld use of the language
'under God'

'?

There was nothing in the Constitution that commanded the Court
not to take up the reapportionment cases. Frankfurter conceded
the Court had jurisdiction. A decision not to decide a constitutional
question properly raised would have been more "policy-oriented"
than the one to decide. The classicist it seems would have been more
at home with Harlan's dissent in Baker, than with Frankfurter's. He
would have had to say either that Tennessee's "crazy quilt" did not
deny complainants equal protection, or that the equal protection
clause does not apply to legislative apportionment. Of course, he
conceivably might say that he found as a matter of "constitutional
interpretation" that the question was "political," but with all due
respect to Professor Wechsler, that begins to resemble legalistic sleight
of hand.145
If one agrees that a policy decision was unavoidable, the question
becomes, would there be more benefit or less harm done through
involvement or noninvolvement? We have tried to demonstrate that
the Court's entry into the reapportionment arena meant an inevitable
development of the "one man, one vote" standard. So, if we put the
Court's choice in terms of specifics, we find the argument against the
decisions must be based on one of four factors. Either
(1) there was nothing seriously wrong with pre-Baker status
quo;
(2) the problem could be handled otherwise;
(3) there is more danger in "one man, one vote" than in malapportionment; or
(4) conceding that the status quo was bad, that there was no
other practical source of relief, and that "one man, one vote" is
145.

Ibid.
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not objectionable, some damage would be done to the Court as
an institution, or to some other aspect of American government,
perhaps the federal concept, by judicial intervention.
WHAT'S "WRONG" WITH MALAPPORTIONMENT?

There was much evidence that state government was being destroyed by malapportionment, 146 apportionment that one would think
could scarcely be justified by anyone who did not have a vested interest in its existence. It is not very convincing, however, to argue
147
to
representation in terms of "statistics" and "malapportionment"
one who is not already opposed to unequal representation (hereinafter called "malapportionment" for convenience). Statistics are
meaningless to him unless he can be convinced that malapportionment is wrong. It can be demonstrated that vote X in one part of
Florida was the equivalent of 180 votes cast in another part, or that
in New Hampshire one vote was equivalent to 1,800 votes in another
district, but he may still say "you still have not proved why anything
is wrong with it." His rejoinder is legitimate. There is reason, however, to believe that much is wrong with malapportionment.
Malapportionment results in a relatively small percentage of the
population being able to elect a majority of the state legislature.
From this fact flow two interrelated evils. First, malapportioned
48
legislatures are not responsive to the needs of the people.1

Second,

malapportioned legislatures are more susceptible to the enticements of
vested interests.
Although there is also empirical evidence to demonstrate the first
proposition, it would seem to be provable a priori. Acceptance of the
fact that a legislature politically responsible to the will of the majority
would be more responsive to the needs of the society than one responsible to a minority, would seem to be part and parcel of our
belief in a republican democracy. If it is not, we should be willing to
accept a benevolent dictator or an oligarchy, for freedom to choose
is the key to the "democratic temper.' 149 Other societies, including
146. See generally 1 DAVID & EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND
SUBURBAN VOTE (1961); Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to
the President for Transmittal to the Congress 39-40 (1955) cited in Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, Apportionment of State Legislatures 24 (1962).

For example, as of June 1, 1961, there were only eleven states in the
147.
Union in which over 35% of the voting population elected a majority of the
members to both houses of the various state legislatures. For only five of those
eleven did the figure reach or go beyond 40%. See Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Apportionment of State Legislatures 15 (1962).
148. See Krastin, The Implementation of Representative Government in a
Democracy, 48 IOWA L. REV. 549, 561-66 (1963).
149. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 24 (1961).
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dictatorships and oligarchies, produce heroes, patriots, and even contented citizens; a democracy, clumsy as it is, produces individual
worth.
The second proposition is based upon the unequal bargaining
power, in relation to number of constituents, that legislators from
over-represented districts have. A key factor in malapportionment
of legislatures is maldistribution of government revenue. Sources
of revenue tend to approximate location of population. If area X
has one per cent of the state's population but ten per cent of its
representation, the chances are that area X's representatives can bring
back to their districts close to ten times the state funds contributed
by those districts. This is not to argue that there is anything inherently
wrong in any given area getting back from government more than it
puts in, if it is based on the area's legitimate needs. The difficulty
lies in the fact that the state representative of the over-represented
district tends to utilize these funds in a flagrantly political frame of
reference, to "buy" popularity in the county or district that continues
to elect him, and in so doing he is less effective when significant
statewide problems conflict with local issues.150 What he is able to
return to his county or district in direct tangible benefits from state
money becomes the matter of political significance, the base of his
political power. Despite all the talk about "big city" political machines, closely contested elections are much rarer in under-represented districts than in those over-represented. The under-represented
district's representative must benefit his constituents through statewide
action. If a legislator has made his district or county "safe" through
thickly-spread patronage and direct state aid, he is in a much better
position to represent various interest and pressure groups, even
though they do not always, or even usually, come from his district.
"States' rights" is an oft-debated and misused proposition today.
There is no doubt that more and more functions once thought to
be in the exclusive domain of state legislatures are now the primary
concern of the national government. Few thoughtful observers, however, can accept the argument that this is totally, or even substantially, due to federal "usurpation." Part of it is inevitable because
of change in empirical circumstance. Many problems are becoming, of
necessity, national in scope and can be dealt with effectively only at
the national level.151 Many persons seriously concerned with "states'
rights," however, are beginning to realize that centralization is being
150. See generally Shull, Political and Partisan Implications of State Legislative Apportionment, 17 LAw & CorNrEMP. PROB. 417 (1952).
151. Water resources development is probably the best example of federalstate wrestling, with the federal government better able to foresee present and
future difficulties and to implement methods of control that are in the best interest

of the entire nation. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
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unnecessarily accelerated by the failure of state governments to meet
their responsibilities. 152 A chief factor in that failure is malapportionment.
A REMEDIAL PROCESS

Can a remedy be found elsewhere? Most attempts to reapportion
state legislatures are blocked by those legislators of over-represented
districts that control the houses. In many instances they are able to
enlist the aid of a representative from an under-represented district.
Why? Because he has won in that district, under-represented though
it may be. The various in interest groups plus the in political party
are not too eager to disturb the status quo. The challenge to any
state legislator to reapportion his government is a personal threat to
53
him and the interest group he serves.1
If a remedy is available it must emit from outside the legislature
itself, for to ask a state legislator to district himself out of a position
of power is to expect too much. To be a saint in Heaven is one thing,
in politics quite another.
Could relief have been forthcoming from Congress? Certainly not
prior to Wesberry. Too many United States Representatives owe their
seats to malapportioned Congressional districts created by malapportioned state legislatures. Could such relief come after the rule in
Wesberry has had a pervasive effect? Probably not if the past conduct
of United States Senators can be taken as evidence. Senators, who
in any malapportioned state are elected by under-represented as well
as over-represented voters, have, in reapportionment matters, appeared
torn between ties to state political machines that have a vested interest
in malapportionment and pressure from constituents who want a fair
voice in state government. The easiest way out is to say it is a matter
of "states' rights."
In Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly,154 it was argued that
when the state had the initiative procedure available, this was an
effective nonjudicial remedy. But in operation, the initiative process
is awkward and expensive to use, especially in a matter as complex

152. As a result of state legislative neglect of urban needs, many city governments by-pass state government and go directly to the national government with
such problems as urban renewal and civil defense. See Silva, Legislative Representation - With Special Reference to New York, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 408,
409 (1962).
153. For examples of how malapportionment would operate see Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1059-66
(1958).
154. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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as districting. A general command to the legislature to redistrict,
would, without judicial enforcement, be futile, as Baker demonstrates.
Since population changes will no doubt continue, and vested interests
would be created in an initiative-adopted apportionment plan, the
initiative would have to be resorted to again and again to keep apportionment current.
FEAR OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION

What then is the fear of equal representation? The most often
expressed fear is the "tyranny" of the majority. But the very purpose
of a legislature is to produce a majority. By the very nature of the
system of government adopted by the founding fathers, the people
were to become the sole source of all political authority. Neither the
farmer nor the industrialist nor the banker, nor anyone else but the
citizen, is the ultimate sovereign. The citizen, all citizens, must
effectively operate, or at least be given the opportunity to function
effectively, if the system is to remain a representative democracy. If,
in a democracy, any group should have a preferred status in the legislature, it should be the majority not a minority. The Constitution,
not increased voting power, has been selected as the means to protect
minority rights against majoritarian tyranny.
Some will no doubt dismiss this as "fuzzy-minded idealism." One
is tempted to say, "so be it," for it is, as Learned Hand pointed out,
the idealism of the founders who were so "naive" as not even to have
anticipated the development of political parties.1 55 It is interesting
how those who often seem almost to have direct communication with
the founders can pass them off as "idealists" when it is demonstrable that their own views and those of the founders cannot be
reconciled.
In his previously mentioned article, Professor Kurland left the
section on reapportionment dangling with the following cryptic
remark:1 50
One wonders, as the Court moves along the path of "American
Legal Realism, with a strong orientation toward a jurisprudence
of values," whether it would have given the Justices any pause
to have read Judge Learned Hand's essay, "Democracy: Its
Presumptions and Realities," especially where he says "My
vote is one of the most unimportant acts of my life."
If we understand Judge Hand, what he meant by this statement,
which appears quite shocking when taken out of context, was that
155. HAND, THE SPIRIT or LIBERTY 90-92 (Dillard ed. 1952).
156. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term- Foreword: Equal in Origin
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branch of the Government,
78 H -v. L. REv. 143, 156-57 (1964) quoting HAND, op. cit. supra note 155, at 93.
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his vote was unimportant if viewed as an enlightened opinion on the
overwhelming complexity of the factors that would tend to make one
candidate preferable to another. This was simply because he did not
have the time, the means, or the ability to fully inform himself on
the positions and abilities of the opposing candidates and their likely
effect on the complicated and technical problems they would be called
upon to handle. He conceded that few, if any, voters could make such
a choice and that most voters tend to vote with the interest group that
1 7
in their opinion most closely matches their own interests. 5
5
But Hand reaffirmed his faith in democracy.1 8 Its value, he said,
lay in the fact that it created a "bloodless measure of social forces";
a bloodless battleground, if you will, upon which these interest groups
could fight out their differences without violence. 159 It would seem
that the battleground is more apt to stay bloodless, if the rules of the
battle are kept fair. Nothing in Judge Hand's essay indicates the
contrary.
If we may presume to answer Professor Kurland's question for
the Court, we would say that if the Justices had read Judge Hand's
essay they would find nothing in it to give them pause concerning the
propriety of their decisions on reapportionment.
It is a fear voiced by many that if this "unimportant act" is
granted equally, the urban-suburban areas will "gain control" and
will tend to vote as a monolithic bloc, passing "liberal" legislation
that could ultimately destroy "Americana." It does not necessarily
follow that reapportioned legislatures are "liberal" legislatures. Professor Andrew Hacker, in a recent study 16 ° of the potential effect of
congressional reapportionment, took four proposals submitted to the
Congress by President Kennedy, which were considered "liberal";
three of the four failed to pass the House. In order to approximate
the probable effect of a House reapportioned on a population basis,
he weighted each vote for and against the four proposals in the House,
157. HAND, op. cit. supra note 155, at 92-94.
158. "Nor will I forsake the faith of our fathers in democracy, however I
must transmute it, and make it unlovely to their eyes, were they here to see their
strangely perverse disciple. If you will give me scales by which to weigh Tom and
Dick and Harry as to their fitness to rule, and tell me how much each shall
count, I will talk with you about some other kind of organization. Plato jumped
hurdles that are too high for my legs; maybe you can help me over, or lower them.
But unless you do, I will stand in the place that I am accustomed to. I will say
that there must be a trying-out of men, according to their qualities as God has
made them; that it is a precious inheritance, which we must not abjure, that
that chance exists; that we must write down our miscarriages to our own flaccid
selves. Meanwhile we shall not bottle up the gases and prepare for the inevitable
explosion." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 99.
159. Id. at 98-99.
160.

HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DIsTmICrING (1963).
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by the population of each representative's district. In the case of
the three defeated measures, the weighted vote would have defeated
each of them by an even larger margin. As for the one proposal that
passed, it would have passed under the weighted vote system, but by
a narrower margin.161
The issue then, as Hacker points out, is not one of liberal or conservative control in state legislatures, but is one of principle and sound
government. True as Harlan points out, "people aren't cyphers," but
that avoids the issue, or maybe it is a polite way of saying government
based on aristocracy should prevail. The issue is, if not a democracy,
then what system? If all citizens are not afforded an equal opportunity to have a voice in their government, then what system? Furthermore, the fear that the "urban majorities" will dominate the
"rural minorities" appears unwarranted. There is every reason to
believe that urbanites will be just as understanding toward the
problems of their rural brethren as their rural brethren have been
toward theirs. Parenthetically, perhaps that is just what some of
the rural power groups fearl
THE COURT'S ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

If we are correct thus far; if the problem was acute, if there was
no practical remedy elsewhere than the Court, and if the cure (equal
representation) was not worse than the disease (malapportionment)
was there still some other objection that outweighed the considerations in favor of the Court's course of action? If so they must relate
to the role of the Court as an institution in the American system
of government.
There are critics of the Court's reapportionment decision that
purport at least to be equally as distressed with malapportionment
as the Court. Some even claim to have no objection to equal districting, if it is effected without the aid of judicial decree. Justice
Frankfurter would seem to be one such person.
Justice Frankfurter is not a friend of malapportioned legislatures.
He has called them "monsters of ingenuity." Yet he would leave
recourse in the hands of a "militant electorate." Surely he must have
realized in Baker that the "militant electorate" lacked any procedural
method for obtaining reapportionment other than by recourse to the
federal courts, unless, of course, they were to become "militant" in
the literal sense of the word, something Frankfurter obviously did
not intend. To accept Frankfurter's position would have been to deny
altogetherall forms of available relief. Frankfurter probably realized
this, yet persisted in resisting acceptance of the case. Why? Could
161.

Id. at 87-91.
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it have been that he was afraid of the Court losing its prestige or
"sustained public confidence"? Certainly all justices probably agree
with Douglas when he said that "a judiciary - no matter how well
insulated from popular pressures -could not withstand for long an
executive or a legislative power that had the consensus of the nation
behind it."162 But if the Court has sustained that confidence while
protecting the rights of unpopular minorities, 163 it does not seem to
follow that it will lose it by protecting the rights of the majority from
an ensconced minority.
Some have attributed his position to his commitment to "judicial
self-restraint," and this may be closer to the mark. Frankfurter, a
self-styled "old-fashioned" liberal,' 6 4 came to the Court immediately
after it had reached its high point of judicial hamstringing of state
and federal legislative programs, and he seemed to be committed to
the proposition that the Court functions best when it strikes down
the least. The people in a democratic society, according to Frankfurter, are also committed to preserving that society. They generally
effectuate reform where needed much faster than the judiciary. They
are better able to determine where, if at all, economy and civil liberbe for Frankties should be separated. The major thesis here would
165
democracy.
in
educated
be
people
the
furter, that
Hyde Park represents a devotion to free speech far more dependable in its assurances, though unprotected by formal constitutional requirement, than reliance upon the litigious process for its enjoyment. Again, widespread popular intolerance
of the third degree, such as manifested itself in the well-known
Savidge affair, reflects a more deeply grounded rule of law than
is disclosed by the painful story of our continuing judicial
endeavor to root out this evil through decisions in occasional
dramatic cases.
He never made a distinction between property rights and personal
rights for "who can say that in a society with a mixed economy, like
";166 whereas, other
ours, these two areas are sharply separated ...
Justices, such as Douglas,16 7 have great respect for legislative opinion
in the former while jealously guarding constitutional rights in the
162.

Douglas, The Bill of Rights is Not Enough in THE GREAT RIGHTS 119-20

(Cahn ed. 1963).
163. As in the segregation cases, the school prayer and Bible reading cases,
and in various cases involving alleged subversives.
164. FRANKFURTER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 436 (Westin ed.
1963).
165. Id. at 447. (Emphasis added.)
166. Id. at 441.
167. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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latter. But the rationale breaks down when it is the people who are
complaining that they are denied an effective voice in their government.
Frankfurter probably realized the path of judicial review after
Baker and was unwilling to impose such a drastic change upon state
legislatures, either because of his essentially "old-fashioned liberal"
orientation or a commitment to judicial restraint that had lost track
of its origin. The one possibly complemented the other.
In other words, Frankfurter probably concluded that population
disparities in legislative districts must be allowed to continue because
they had existed in the past and, more importantly, few seemed to object to any great degree, or at least most people had resigned themselves to accept these disparities in some degree.
Yet Frankfurter did not hesitate to take affirmative action in
Brown v. Board of Education despite the fact that most citizens did
not loudly object or had resigned themselves to racial segregation as
an embarrasing anomoly in our free society. In fact, in Baker, Frankfurter said removing racial discriminations is a "constitutional imperative." Perhaps this was because Frankfurter saw no reason at all
for discriminations based on race. Then it no doubt follows, as his
opinion in Baker seems to demonstrate, that he saw some reason in
unequal, even malapportioned, legislatures, that he accepted the
Gestalt judgment that unequal districting was better than, or as good
as, equal districting, even though he realized that the proposition
could not be defended by logic or empirical evidence.
We suggest, and only suggest with all due respect, that it was the
"old-fashioned liberal's" feeling that although the Government exists
for the people it does not necessarily follow that they will benefit
most by having it exist entirely of them.
What we do put forth more strongly and a little less respectfully
is that the concept of "judicial restraint" as used by Justice Frankfurter and his devotees, is hardly more than a slightly self-righteous
illusion. Unless "judicial restraint" is to become "judicial abdication,"
which is the negation of the concept of judicial review, then is not
the decision of the Justice when to restrain himself and when not,
a decision involving a value preference of his own?
Judicial restraint then becomes one of two things - either an
abandonment of the power of judicial review, or in the alternative
merely a way of saying, "I am more tolerant of opposing views than
you are," which frequently could be translated as "I am not quite so
opposed to that particular view as you are."
In the reapportionment cases we believe it comes to the same
thing. If the Court has no business enforcing the very essence of the
social contract, the basis of representation, it has no business at all.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

How can a court justify deferring to a legislative act as an expression
of the will of the people if it takes no cognizance of the fact that the
legislature does not in fact represent the people? We see no rejoinder here in Harlan's arguments that "people aren't cyphers" and
that people can be represented by those whom they do not vote for,
or that a representative is elected "by the people" if he is elected by
two or more members of the human species rather than by dogs or
machines. For to accept the Harlan definition of "representative
government" is to make every government that ever existed "representative," and thus to define the term out of existence.
The remaining argument is that when we ask the Court to enter
this area we are in effect jumping from the frying pan into the fire.
We are shifting responsibility from a legislature in which we have
some representation, however diluted and practically meaningless, to
a body of judicial life-time appointees over whom we have no control. Let us reply that it is at least a fire that can be easily extinguished.
We have already mentioned the dependence of the Court on the
legislative and executive branches. The President and Congress have
many weapons in their arsenal for use against a runaway Court:
limits on jurisdiction, expansion or contraction of the Court's personnel, refusal to enforce, or modified or lethargic enforcement of the
Court's decrees, or more gradual change by the replacement of
Justices, and even the drastic and only once used power of impeachment. It is no doubt true as Frankfurter has said, the only thing that
keeps these weapons in check is sustained public confidence in the
Court.
We believe that confidence runs much deeper than is suspected by
those who push the concept of judicial restraint to the point of judicial timidity. President Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly underestimated public confidence in the Court even though he was dealing with
an extremely "activist" Court and one that was grossly out of line with
the American consensus.
No Court has ever been toppled on the basis of one decision. The
Court will be given time to "get the message," as it was in the thirties. Or, the people will give themselves time to make their consensus
match the Court's, as we believe has happened in the fifties and
sixties. That there is now a consensus behind Brown is demonstrated
by the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, although it took ten years
to reach. The Court's decisions that civil liberties must be protected
even in times when the national security is threatened, have been approved in the repudiation of McCarthyism and neo-McCarthyism by
the vast majority of the people. In light of the support given the
school prayer and Bible reading cases by outstanding churchmen, the
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people have "gotten the message" to their elected representatives that
they want to ponder that problem long and hard before taking any
drastic action in regard to their American institutions.
The reapportionment cases themselves are in point. The House,
whose members have not yet for the most part felt the effect of
Wesberry, proposed to strip all federal courts of their jurisdiction in
reapportionment. But the senators, who in any given state, are responsible to under-represented people as well as over-represented,
were torn between allegiance to their state party machines, which opposed the decisions, and to their constituents who strongly favored
them. The result was that the decisions stand as written.
The Court's precarious dependence on the other two branches,
shielded only by public confidence, is not, as the judicially fainthearted seem to imply, analogous to the nuclear balance of terror.
It is not true that if ever the Congress or President must act to curb
the Court our American way of life will be irrevocably changed. They
have so acted in the past. Five times, the size of the Court has been
changed for political reasons. Once jurisdiction was taken from the
Court in a pending constitutional case. One Justice was impeached,
but acquitted. Each time the Court came back, stronger than before.
Even if the people were to lose confidence in a particular Court
it is unlikely that they would lose faith in the Court as an institution.
And we do not believe, as some have suggested, that this faith is
based upon public belief in a myth that the Justices are mere technicians unraveling in a mechanical way the wisdom of the past. We
believe that the people understand that the Justices are trying to take
the spirit of the American Constitution, as it has evolved through our
history, and as they understand it, and make it relevant to today's
life as they, with their mortal limitations and individual differences,
see it to be relevant. As long as the people believe the Court is faithfully trying to do that job, and as long as the Court's views in these
matters are not too far, too consistently, and for too long out of step
with that of the majority of the people, the people will not lose faith
in the Court.
CONCLUSION

The concept of constitutionalismhas been reborn with the increasing concern for civil liberties. These liberties, just as any aspect
of law, do not lend themselves to categorical absolutism. Each
additional part of the puzzle must be examined in light of the functional requirements demanded by the Constitution. The methodology
of the Supreme Court does not allow, for the most part, the faith in
the rationalistic, deductive reasoning approach prevalent during the
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pre-Darwinian period, but tends more toward an empirical approach
characteristic of other fields of the social sciences today.
An ever-changing, complex, technical-industrial society demands
dynamics in the judicial function. This requires an examination of
the basic contract and its impact upon society, and how best to achieve
the correct result. This concerns not Austin's social process, but an
all-inclusive social process. The judicial function must, of necessity,
include an examination of the society it seeks to protect. A value
judgment must be developed and a conclusion reached only after all
interests have been explored and developed. This, then, is constitutionalism, a necessity in today's social order.
This is what the Court did in the reapportionment cases. A
"policy decision" was inevitable. The social problem was such that
hope of any solution coming from another source had all but evaporated. The Court had to decide whether or not to close off the last
avenue of relief. Certainly there was nothing in the text of the Constitution, "framers' intent," past practice, or precedent that demanded
a different result. The Court was concerned with a judicial rule of
law. Had it elected not to intervene, that too would have been a
"policy decision" just as much as its intervention was a "policy decision." In one sense, it would have been more "policy oriented" to
refuse to intervene, because the strict constructionist view that the
Court must decide all legal questions properly presented antedates the
idea that judicial policy may be a valid reason for judicial nonintervention. The problem was part and parcel a creature of judicial
policy making no matter which way the Court turned. Once the decision had been reached the Court would then be responsible for an
eventual enumeration, with some degree of precision, of the limitations
of discretion open to legislators in framing districting statutes. Deciding in each specific case just how much deviation from the population base would be considered "reasonable" would have been an impossible task, or at least a task in which the Court's reasoning could
not be satisfactorily articulated. By the same measure, there was
little to gain in trying to preserve unequal districting.
Although the Constitution establishes certain guidelines from
which the Court can operate, an additional ingredient must be the
social structure in which the Court functions and the identification
and application within that frame of reference, of appropriate rules.
The answer is not that the legislators might have a competence in
this area that judges do not possess, for that evades the constitutional
role of the Court. Relative competence in rule making is only one
factor that determines whether a matter belongs in the legislature or
the Court. If a right is infringed and a legislature, especially one not
responsible to the people, fails to act or acts to infringe the right,
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the Court must intervene, even if ideally the legislature is better
suited for action in that area. Furthermore, in this case, no one,
neither legislator, political scientist, nor other, even attempted to
demonstrate, logically or empirically, how legislative ability could
effectively "balance" unequal districts. Those who would put forth
the concept that apportionment based on factors other than population was superior or at least equal to population-based apportionment are, in effect, asking its acceptance as an article of faith. And as
in theological faith there is a fear mechanism working in favor of the
proponents of this position - a fear of the unknown. Will the masses
rule, hence destroying all that the select has built?
The Court is not to take the place of other branches of government, but it must see that those other branches are fulfilling their role
in our democratic structure; more importantly in the context of the
immediate problem, that they are what they purport to be. This
has always been the Court's business and will continue to be as long
as the present Court structure lasts. The alternative would be to
abolish judicial review, for only then would the present judicial
function be altered. That, of course, is suggested from time to time.
But are Americans ready to accept it? We have come to rely on the
Court. There may be a commitment to free speech at Hyde Park
that exceeds that of the Supreme Court, but is there always such a
commitment in the committee rooms of the House of Representatives,
or of the various state capitol buildings?
Still there is a reluctance to admit that the Court does make policy
decisions, that the Court, as Justice Holmes said "must legislate," or
for that matter, that the Court should. This reluctance, especially by
the Court's defenders, aids the Court's critics who eagerly insist that
policy decisions are being made every day by the Court, and that is
the danger.
No society is as law-oriented as the United States. Americans tend
to disagree with politicians in a more virulent form than they would
disagree with a judge. Part of this deference to judges, it is often
suggested, stems from the belief that a judge, unlike a politician, is
not urging his own beliefs upon an electorate, but is applying his
special, technical, mechanical skill to bring forth wisdom from the
mythical supermortals. This position is unfortunate when examined
within the framework of the rather paradoxical position in which
society has placed the Court. Although the Court must "watch over"
the governmental function, it cannot be in any way political, but
must strike a delicate balance between apparently conflicting positions. The conflict must be resolved by the Court, yet the Court
cannot interfere with government in attempting an acceptable solution.
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There has always been a fear that the "oligarchic" label given the
Court by Frankfurter,16s might bear fruit. Certainly the Court has
not always shined as an example of model judicial deference to the
complexities and needs of society. It would seem that at least some
of the enthusiasm for legal realism in the thirties was generated by a
desire to rub the gloss off the opinions of a Court that was striking
down so many New Deal measures. Today's Court critics are attempting to do the same thing in a rather unsophisticated fashion. They
seem to believe that the most effective way to criticize the Court's decisions is to attack the competence or integrity of the Justices. If the
classical view of the law is correct, then a justice who is competent
in his trade and honest with himself cannot make a wrong decision.
Hence the present Court, argue the more vociferous critics, is deliberately ignoring the Constitution and has established its own "social
design," which it intends to use its full force and power to carry out.
It is, then, an oligarchy owing allegiance to no document.
To label the Court "oligarchic" is to ignore the purpose and role
of the Court in the American system. One of the major ingredients of
an oligarchy is the removal of consent of the governed. The judiciary does not always have the final say. The judiciary must have
the people and the other branches behind it, otherwise the pronouncements would be nothing more than mental gymnastics. A
unanimous Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, announced in
1954 that segregation of the races in public schools was unconstitutional. Did the Southern states curse, but integrate? Certainly not,
they cursed but for the most part still have not integrated. An oligarchy is a trifle more efficient!
Still it was the Court, not the Constitution, not the legislative or
the executive branches of government, nor the "consensus of the nation," that bore the brunt of the criticism. Criticism usually began
by saying that nothing in the fourteenth amendment expressly addresses itself to integration in the public schools.
Yet even the Court's defenders failed to make clear the process,
be it pragmatic, realistic, or sociological, by which the Court was
able to eliminate the constitutional basis for the separate but equal
doctrine in public education. Instead, they, all too frequently, elected to meet the Court's critics on their mythical battleground and
to engage in strained argument directed at the idea that the Court's
decision was commanded by the Constitution. In so doing, the defenders put themselves at a disadvantage and frequently ended, and
still end, by lending aid and support to those with whom they have no
sympathy. Thus one sees an eminent constitutional scholar, Professor
Herbert Wechsler, call for "neutral principles" of constitutional law,
168. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555 (1949).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss3/1

50

Laughlin and Baldwin: The Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the Constitutional Adjudica
1964]

THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES: A STUDY

the nature of which he admittedly is unable to contemplate. 16 9 He
would have the Court adopt and follow that which is not, or which, if
it is, has not been discovered. He is supported by another eminent
scholar, Professor Henry Hart. Furthermore, other friends of the
Court such as Professor Louis Pollak now seem willing to meet this
new clique of Court critics on its own more ephemeral home court, by
attempting to demonstrate that the Court does follow "neutral principles." It would seem that the reason for such sophistic debates stems
from a basic distrust of those intellectuals for the public at large, the
masses if you will.
Many of the Court's friends seem to fear that the public will only
comprehend half the truth. They will accept the idea that the Court
is making policy because certainly both friend and foe alike would be
saying so. But, of greater importance, they will probably continue
to believe, with the urging of the critics, that a better Court could
decide cases without making policy. If the Court has a function in a
democratic society and is performing it, then the people need neither
rebel against it, nor accept the role of serfdom to respect it.
The Court's policy-making function, is circumscribed to some extent by the nature of its position. It is limited by the text and spirit
of the Constitution, which while permitting leeway does set outer
limits on the range of possible decisions. It will be argued, as Justice
Gibson did, dissenting in Eakin v. Raub17 ° that legislators and other
government officials as well as judges take an oath to uphold the
Constitution, and it should not be presumed that these other officials
take their obligation less seriously than the Justices. But faithfulness
to the Constitution as judge on the one hand or as a legislator or
executive on the other are distinct matters. Such is the American commitment to legalism that the legislator or President may, if he thinks
a given problem is serious enough, consider it his duty to push the
Constitution to the limit, relying on the Court to call him up if he
goes too far. The judge, on the other hand, since Marbury, has
known that the final decision, short of amendment, rests with him,
and his sense of this responsibility is itself a restraint on judicial recklessness.
Secondly, the Court's policy-making power is circumscribed by
putting it in the judicial setting. For example, could the Court add
medical care for all or for the aged to the Social Security program?
Even if the Court is as bent on total egalitarianism as Professor Kurland suggests, it is hard to see how it could do so today without abandoning all pretext of being a Court, which of course would mean its
169. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.

L. REv. 1 (1959).
170. 12 S. &R. 330, 344-68 (Pa. 1825).
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downfall. This in and of itself, however, will satisfy only a few. The
key then must lie elsewhere. It lies in the need for judicial review.
Dissenting in Baker, Frankfurter comments favorably on what he
saw as the Court's unwillingness to arbitrate "broad issues of political
organization." Although he hedges this with the limitation: "historically committed to other institutions and for whose adjustment the
judicial process is ill adapted," this is a perplexing statement. Certainly from the very beginning, with no historical commitment, the
Court in such cases as Marbury v. Madison, Fletcher v. Peck, Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, and Cohens v. Virginia decided the broadest issues
of political organization. Even Frankfurter must agree that those
decisions were as crucial to the development and vitalization of the
United States as the efforts of the Constitutional Convention.
Rousseau argued for a social contract; the Sovereign was merely
the exercise of the general will. Power may be given to the Sovereign,
but not the will. The general will would be protected with a contract,
otherwise he envisioned a dictatorship. The same results could occur,
even under a contract where the general will was not heard. Successive majorities could disenfranchise minorities. The contract would
be of little value unless adhered to - unless enforced. Only then
would it become a government.
Dean Rostow has urged the Court's energetic enforcement of political liberties, pointing out that in so doing they were assuring that
the citizen functioned properly in the democratic process. 171 His comments were largely in response to Judge Learned Hand's position that
the Bill of Rights was scarcely more than a moral admonition to the
Congress. Rostow, on the other hand, believed that judicial enforcement of those rights was a necessity, lest "democracy" destroy itself.
It would seem, then, that the Court in the reapportionment cases
is functioning in the highest tradition of its role as an American
institution. It is preserving the government by enforcing the social
contract.
Professor Bickel has sought to analogize the present Court's activities in the reapportionment cases to "an earlier era of misguided judicial effort." The reference is to those Courts that under such fabrications as "freedom of contract" sought to supplant the economic
theories of the elected representatives of the people with its own, and
also to those Courts that sought to substitute their policies for that
of the legislatures when it came to such pragmatic questions as utility
rate making and labor relations.
This criticism is unfounded, if Dean Rostow's premise that the
political branches of government form the economic policies with a
171.

Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv.

193 (1952).
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wide range of constitutional discretion and judicial deference can
be accepted. This would then leave the responsibility for ensuring
the "full democratic potentialities" of the people to the Court.
Any nation can call itself a democracy, but labeling does not make
it so. Certainly the "peoples' democracies" of the Communist world
well illustrate this point. Some democracies have functioned successfully without a court having the power of judicial review, as in England. But in the United States the constitutional court is part and
parcel of the system. This is not to suggest, as some have, that Americans are less committed to democracy than their English brethren.
It is merely a matter of the accustomed method of implementation.
Even in a democracy the people must repose their trust somewhere. For example, the very physical existence of our nation depends
upon the good faith of the President not to press the nuclear button
just because he has had a bad breakfast. In England with no judicial review the people trust the members of Parliament to uphold
the constitution, and the members in turn accept that trust. In the
United States, we have, since Marbury at least, entrusted that function
to the Court. The legislators therefore have not felt so burdened, at
least not in the same sense. For example, in England, Parliament
created an independent nonpolitical commission to reapportion itself.
In America, the task was left for the courts by legislators whose consciences were apparently untroubled. To Americans a social contract without a court to enforce it is nudum pactum.
There is no sign that the people have abdicated their authority.
It is still their Court. There is many a difference between power on
paper and power in fact. Robert Hutchins relates a conversation he
had with a Netherlands Minister of Education, who in theory had
unlimited authority in hiring faculty at the nation's universities.
Hutchins asked him why he did not exercise that authority in the
case of a man whom the Minister apparently wished to appoint, but
who was opposed by most of his prospective colleagues at the university in question. "My government would fall," was the answer. There
is a similar limitation on the Court.72
Finally, public faith in the Court is not based upon public acceptance of the myth of mechanical jurisprudence, which is to say
public ignorance. Perhaps the layman understands legal realism
better than the lawyer would like to think. Perhaps he does realize
that judges tend to disagree and hence that it is rather fruitless to
ask, "What is the law?" Could it be that, like doctors, lawyers are
afraid to stop talking Latin?

172. HtrrCHINS, Two FAcES oF FsamRusM 52 (1961).
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Justice Douglas has pointed out that the Court is the people's
watchdog over their government. If the people do not want it, they
can eliminate it. But they are not likely to be persuaded by noisy
politicians to eliminate their working democracy. For the Court in
the reapportionment cases began breathing life back into the most
sacred part of the contract - representative democracy.
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